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CULTURAL COGNITION AT WORK 
PAUL M. SECUNDA*
ABSTRACT
 Cultural cognition theory provides an anthropological- and psychological-based theory 
about how values actually influence judicial decisionmaking. It suggests that values act as 
a subconscious influence on cognition rather than as a self-conscious motive of decisionmak-
ing. 
 Applying these insights to two controversial United States Supreme Court labor and 
employment decisions, this Article contends that judges, in many instances, are not fighting 
over ideology, but rather over legally consequential facts. This type of disagreement is par-
ticularly prevalent in labor and employment law cases where the factual issues that divide 
judges involve significant uncertainty and turn on inconclusive evidence.   
 This distinction between ideology and cultural cognition is critical for two connected 
reasons. First, the identification of cultural worldviews, as opposed to partisan or legal bias, 
as a major influence on judicial decisionmaking assists in bringing legitimacy back to the 
judging function. Second, social science research indicates that techniques exist for judges to 
counteract their susceptibility to this form of biased decisionmaking. 
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The Court's failure to recognize the culturally partial view of social 
reality that its conclusion embodies is symptomatic of a kind of 
cognitive bias that is endemic to legal and political decisionmaking 
and that needlessly magnifies cultural conflict over and discontent 
with the law.1
I.   INTRODUCTION
 At the recent United States Supreme Court confirmation hearings 
of Justice Sonia Sotomayor, commentators focused heavily on one 
comment that Sotomayor made at a number of lectures in the past. 
Sotomayor had said that she hoped that “a wise Latina woman with 
the richness of her experiences would more often than not reach a 
better conclusion than a white male who hasn't lived that life.”2 Al-
though critics widely lambasted her for this statement,3 and she her-
self later backed away from it to secure her nomination,4 a kernel of 
truth nevertheless emerged from this confirmation proceeding skir-
mish; not that ideologically driven judging is inevitably part of the 
judging function, but rather that a judge cannot help but be influ-
enced by his or her cultural background. So, although reasonable 
people might disagree that a female Latina judge “reach[es] a better 
conclusion”5 than her white male counterpart “more often than not,”6
this Article maintains that a judge’s cultural background does sub-
consciously have a very real impact on the outcome of legal decisions.  
 Indeed, contrary to many commentators who have suggested that 
judging is generally an ideologically driven enterprise,7 Dan Kahan, 
                                                                                                                               
 1. Dan M. Kahan et al., Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the 
Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837, 881 (2009). 
 2. Sonia Sotomayor, A Latina Judge’s Voice, 13 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J 87, 92 (2002). 
Justice Sotomayor delivered these comments on one occasion at the University of Califor-
nia, Berkeley, School of Law in 2001, as part of the Judge Mario G. Olmos Memorial Lec-
ture. Id. at 87. 
 3. See Laura E. Gómez, Commentary: What the “Wise Latina” Remark Meant, 
CNN.COM, July 14, 2009, http://edition.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/07/14/gomez.supreme.
court/index.html (“[Sonia Sotomayor’s] comment has been lampooned on the cover of the 
National Review, where cartoonists apparently could not quite fathom a wise Latina judge, 
choosing to portray Sotomayor as a Buddha with Asian features. It has caused Rush Lim-
baugh and others to label her a ‘racist,’ and it has caused even liberals to bristle.”). 
 4. See Robert Barnes & Paul Kane, Sotomayor Repudiates “Wise Latina” Comment,
THE BOSTON GLOBE, July 15, 2009, at A1. 
 5. Sotomayor, supra note 2.
 6. Id.
 7. In particular, this attitudinal model “represents a melding together of key con-
cepts from legal realism, political science, psychology, and economics. This model holds 
that [courts] decide[] disputes in light of the facts of the case vis-à-vis the ideological atti-
tudes of the justices. Simply put, Rehnquist votes the way he does because he is extremely 
conservative; Marshall voted the way he did because he was extremely liberal.” JEFFREY A.
SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVI-
SITED 86 (2002). For studies applying the attitudinal model, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL.,
ARE JUDGES POLITICAL?: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 150 (2006) 
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Donald Braman, and other members of Yale Law School’s Cultural 
Cognition Project have persuasively argued that such popular theo-
ries do not sufficiently explain the mechanism by which values influ-
ence judges.8 In other words, a critical distinction exists between cul-
tural outlooks as a source of normative judgment or evaluation, on 
the one hand, and cultural outlooks as an unconscious influence of 
perceptions of fact, on the other.9 The former may be thought of as 
the Dworkinian equation of law with moral value.10 The latter type of 
cultural outlook, cultural cognition, posits that cultural understand-
ings are “prior to factual beliefs on highly charged political issues.”11
This Article contends that it is cultural cognition that provides a 
more robust explanation of how judicial values impact judicial deci-
sions, and importantly, how disagreements come to exist between 
judges in particularly hotly contested cases or areas of the law.  
 One such area of the law that is highly polarized is labor and em-
ployment law. From traditional union-management disputes to em-
ployment discrimination and employee benefit cases, the two sides of 
these workplace debates cannot even agree on the meaning of perti-
nent facts a lot of the time. And it is not just the parties that see the 
relevant facts differently, but also appellate judges reviewing  
these cases. 
                                                                                                                               
(“The most difficult issues are resolved, [and] the principal empirical findings are clear. In 
many domains, Republican appointees vote very differently from Democratic appointees, 
and ideological tendencies are both dampened and amplified by the composition of the pan-
el.”); Orley Ashenfelter et al., Politics and the Judiciary: The Influence of Judicial Back-
ground on Case Outcomes, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 257 (1995); Pat K. Chew & Robert E. Kelley, 
Myth of the Color-Blind Judge: An Empirical Analysis of Racial Harassment Cases, 86 
WASH. U. L. REV. 1117, 1121 (2009) (focusing on judges’ race and political affiliation, 
among other factors, to determine judicial bias in the racial workplace harassment con-
text); Richard A. Posner, The Role of the Judge in the Twenty-First Century, 86 B.U. L. REV.
1049, 1052 (2006) (“At its crudest, [ideological voting] is the idea that judges and Justices 
simply vote their political preferences, so if you know whether they are Democrats or Re-
publicans you can predict their decisions; a more refined version substitutes ideology for 
party affiliation.”). 
 8. For a description of culture cognition theory and the various projects being studied 
by different scholars using this theory, see THE CULTURAL COGNITION PROJECT AT YALE 
LAW SCHOOL, http://www.culturalcognition.net (last visited Oct. 18, 2010) [hereinafter 
Cultural Cognition Project].  
 9. Cultural cognition theory explains that values act as a subconscious influence on 
decisionmaker cognition, rather than as a self-conscious motive for decisionmaking. See
Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, Cultural Cognition and Public Policy, 24 YALE L. & 
POL’Y REV. 149, 156-57 (2006).  
 10. See RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW 1-12 (1996) (arguing for judicial decisions 
based on moral values); RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 131-49 (1978). See 
also Chad M. Oldfather, Judges as Humans: Interdisciplinary Research and the Problems 
of Institutional Design, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 125, 133 (2007) (“Strategic models . . . view 
judges as acting to effect their policy preferences, but in a [c]onsiderably more nuanced and 
less reflexive manner. They do not focus simply on the case at hand, but take a  
longer view.”). 
 11. Kahan & Braman, supra note 9, at 150. 
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 Now, it is true that workplace cases can be viewed as largely par-
tisan exercises in which conservative judges vote for employers or 
management and liberal ones vote in the opposite manner in favor of 
union or employee interests. Yet, however one defines “ideology,”12
the common ideological explanations for judges’ behavior in 
workplace cases are inadequate. Culture cognition theory, for its 
part, suggests that judges are really disagreeing about legally conse-
quential facts over which there is some speculation and uncertainty. 
In fact, such disagreements are especially prevalent in labor and em-
ployment cases where the factual issues that divide judges involve a 
large amount of speculation and inconclusive evidence about: em-
ployer and employee motivations, the proper measure for efficiency in 
both the public and private workplace, and the proper standard for 
technical or arcane measurements in the workplace (like technologi-
cal feasibility in the OSHA context).13 To illustrate this point, this 
Article analyzes two of the more controversial labor and employment 
decisions by the Supreme Court in the past two decades where a spe-
cifically illiberal form of judicial bias—cognitive illiberalism—is on 
display in the Justices’ opinions.14
                                                                                                                               
 12. Professor Kahan has explored at least three different ways in which legal scholars 
have discussed the manner in which judges’ values impact their decisions: (1) values could 
supply a self-conscious partisan motivation for a decision; that is, “choosing the outcome 
that best promotes their political preferences without regard for the law”; (2) values could 
supply a self-conscious legal motivation for a decision in which there does not exist “a strict 
separation between moral reasoning and legal reasoning”; this might be referred to as cul-
ture as evaluation; or (3) values could help judges resolve certain disputed factual claims 
embedded in what they agree is the controlling standard; this third way, cultural cognition, 
maintains that values operate through a subconscious influence on cognition. See Dan M. 
Kahan, “Ideology In” or “Cultural Cognition of” Judging: What Difference Does It Make?, 92 
MARQ. L. REV. 413, 415-16 (2009). Although I believe the first way is what many political 
scientists mean when they say that judicial decisions are all about politics or ideology, in 
reality I believe that the second way, where “[j]udges . . . resort to normative theories to 
connect abstract concepts like ‘free speech’ and ‘equal protection’ to particular cases,” is 
closer to how ideology is thought to actually operate by most legal academic commentators 
studying attitudinal models. Id. at 415 (arguing that this type of ideology involves merely 
the sort of moral theorizing the law itself contemplates). Of course, this Article argues the 
third way best describes how judges’ values impact their decisions. 
 13. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 271 (1989) (O'Connor, J., 
concurring) (noting that the entire purpose of the shifting burdens of proof applicable in 
employment discrimination cases “is to compensate for the fact that direct evidence of in-
tentional discrimination is hard to come by”); United Steelworkers v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 
1189, 1264-66 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (per Skelly Wright, C.J.) (observing, in OSHA standards-
setting context: “As for [proof of] technological feasibility, we know that we cannot require 
of OSHA anything like certainty. Since ‘technology-forcing’ assumes the agency will make 
highly speculative projections about future technology, a standard is obviously not infeasi-
ble solely because OSHA has no hard evidence to show that the standard has been met.”); 
Martin J. Katz, The Fundamental Incoherence of Title VII: Making Sense of Causation in 
Disparate Treatment Law, 94 GEO. L.J. 489, 491-92 (2006) (describing the difficulty of de-
termining employer motivation when analyzing disparate treatment). 
 14. Cognitive illiberalism may be defined as “a failure to recognize the connection 
between perceptions of societal risk and contested visions of the ideal society.” Suja A. 
Thomas, The Fallacy of Dispositive Procedure, 50 B.C. L. REV. 759, 776 n.110 (2009).  
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 This distinction between viewing judges as subconsciously moti-
vated by cultural preferences rather than by prejudicial partisan or 
legal objectives is a crucial one. First, if the form of bias in judicial 
decisionmaking is not properly understood, the judging function is 
unnecessarily delegitimized as being merely a partisan or normative 
exercise. Second, although it is impossible to rid judicial decisions of 
all remnants of bias because of the manner in which human cognition 
operates,15 social science and legal research indicate that debiasing 
techniques do exist for judges to counteract their susceptibility to the 
more troubling and illiberal aspects of their biased decisionmaking. 
Such techniques include adopting appropriate judicial habits of mind 
and writing judicial decisions that consider the varying background 
values of impacted parties. 
 In all, then, this Article seeks to explore, for the first time, wheth-
er the theory of cultural cognition may provide a more complete ex-
planation for how controversial labor and employment law issues are 
decided by judges with different worldviews. In the process, it also 
hopes to provide a roadmap for minimizing the amount of cognitive 
illiberalism in these highly contested types of cases. Part II outlines 
the general theory behind cultural cognition, including its social 
science roots, its more recent application to legal issues, and finally, 
its meaning for judicial decisionmaking. Part III then reviews two 
labor and employment law cases decided by the U.S. Supreme Court 
to study how values appear to subconsciously influence judges’ per-
ception of legally consequential facts and consequently, their deci-
sions in these cases. Part IV highlights the significance of appreciat-
ing these cases through a cultural cognition prism. Finally, Part V 
concludes by explaining how decisionmaker bias of this form may be 
counteracted through innovative social science and legal techniques.  
More specifically, judges could exercise judicial humility to guide 
courts away from unnecessary decisions that appear to embrace par-
tisanship and delegitimize the concerns of a group of citizens who 
come out on the losing end in such cases.  Alternatively, opinions 
written in an expressively overdetermined manner, capitalizing on 
ideas of individual self-affirmation, could provide a powerful tool in 
toning down the rhetoric and the overheated disagreements, which 
are all-too-frequent in many of today’s judicial decisions. 
                                                                                                                               
 15. Indeed, some forms of judicial bias in judicial opinions are desirable. Judges 
should generally evaluate situations in a way that embodies a stance toward phenomena in 
the world that accurately expresses what they (along with others who share their defining 
commitments) care about. In this Article, I am merely seeking to employ debiasing strate-
gies on more regrettable forms of judicial decisionmaking bias in which judges exhibit 
“overconfidence in the unassailable correctness of the factual perceptions [they] hold in 
common with [their] confederates and unwarranted contempt for the perceptions asso-
ciated with [their] opposites.” Kahan et al., supra note 1, at 843. This type of bias has been 
labeled “cognitive illiberalism” and this paper looks for techniques to preempt it. Id.
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II.   A PRIMER ON THE THEORY OF CULTURAL COGNITION
 Cultural cognition is a heuristic that comes to the legal academy 
from research conducted in the disciplines of anthropology and social 
psychology.16 In a sentence, “[c]ultural cognition refers to a collection 
of psychological mechanisms that moor our perceptions of societal 
danger to our cultural values.”17 As a result, individuals gravitate 
toward factual beliefs which permit them to see worthwhile conduct 
as also socially beneficial conduct.18 Moreover, to the extent that dis-
agreement exists about the harmfulness of a particular form of con-
duct, individuals tend to trust those who share their values.19
 The first section of this Part explores the foundational roots of cul-
tural cognition theory and the connection between cultural values 
and perceived societal risks. The second section then explains how 
cultural cognition theory applies to legal issues and controversies, 
with emphasis on a recent empirical study conducted by Dan Kahan, 
David Hoffman, and Donald Braman in the criminal procedure/civil 
rights context. 
A.   The Roots of Cultural Cognition Theory 
1.   The Anthropological Roots 
 Cultural cognition theory borrows heavily from well-known anth-
ropological studies that explore the relationship between risk percep-
tion and cultural worldviews.20 These worldviews “are the filters 
through which a person views the world—how it is and how it should 
be—they profoundly influence peoples' attitudes.”21 In one of her well-
                                                                                                                               
 16. See Kahan & Braman, supra note 9, at 152. 
 17. Dan M. Kahan, The Cognitively Illiberal State, 60 STAN. L. REV. 115, 117 (2007). 
See also Cultural Cognition Project, supra note 8 (“Cultural cognition refers to the tenden-
cy of individuals to conform their beliefs about disputed matters of fact (e.g., whether glob-
al warming is a serious threat; whether the death penalty deters murder; whether gun 
control makes society more safe or less) to values that define their cultural identities.”).  
 18. See Kahan, supra note 17, at 120 (“Whether we regard putatively harmful activi-
ties (deviant sexual practices, gun possession, nuclear power) with fear or admiration, with 
disgust or equanimity, with dread or indifference, expresses the cultural valuations we 
attach to those activities.”). 
 19. See Nancy Levit, Confronting Conventional Thinking: The Heuristics Problem in 
Feminist Legal Theory, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 391, 394 (2006) (“[W]hen decision makers use 
simplifying heuristics, they are likely to make mistakes in the direction of their pre-
existing biases.”).  
 20. People generally use simplifying heuristics to think about risk, including “some 
psychological (people fear the unfamiliar), some social (people fear what their friends fear), 
and some cultural (people fear things that threaten their shared worldviews).” See James 
Grimmelmann, Saving Facebook, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1137, 1160 (2009) (footnotes omitted). 
 21. Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Cognitive Theory and the Delivery of Welfare Benefits, 40 
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 253, 258 (2009) (“Worldviews are primarily unconscious and affectively-
based cognitive systems of beliefs, attitudes, and assumptions. They serve as a framework 
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known works, anthropologist Mary Douglas sets up a typology of cul-
tural worldviews.22 Under this framework, there are two basic 
worldviews: “the first concerns the relationship of the individual to 
the group (individualistic versus communitarian orientation); the 
second concerns the nature of society (hierarchical versus egalita-
rian).”23
 Kahan and Braman have aptly summarized one way of potentially 
understanding the meaning of these various cultural preferences for 
individuals’ worldviews: 
A “low group” worldview coheres with an individualistic social or-
der, in which individuals are expected to secure their own needs 
without collective assistance, and in which individual interests en-
joy immunity from regulation aimed at securing collective inter-
ests. A “high group” worldview, in contrast, supports a solidaristic
or communitarian social order, in which collective needs trump in-
dividual initiative, and in which society is expected to secure the 
conditions of individual flourishing. A “high grid” worldview favors 
a hierarchical society, in which resources, opportunities, duties, 
rights, political offices and the like are distributed on the basis of 
conspicuous and largely fixed social characteristics—gender, race, 
class, lineage. A “low grid” worldview favors an egalitarian society, 
one that emphatically denies that social characteristics should 
matter in how resources, opportunities, duties and the like are dis-
tributed.24
 Consider how Douglas’s cultural worldviews framework can be 
utilized to illuminate the nature of the political and legal disputes 
endemic to American labor and employment law. Prounion or proem-
ployee rights individuals tend to be low grid/high group in orienta-
tion.25 Such individuals embrace collectivist values such as solidarity 
with their fellow workers and are content to wield the power of the 
collective against employers even though they must generally put 
                                                                                                                               
for an individual's interaction with her surroundings, including other people and society.”). 
See also Grimmelmann, supra note 20, at 1161-62.   
 22. See MARY DOUGLAS, NATURAL SYMBOLS: EXPLORATIONS IN COSMOLOGY 54-68 
(1970).  
 23. Kornhauser, supra note 21, at 258. 
 24. Kahan & Braman, supra note 9, at 153-54 (footnote omitted) (citing Steve Rayner, 
Cultural Theory and Risk Analysis, in SOCIAL THEORIES OF RISK 83, 87 (S. Krimsky & D. 
Goldin eds., 1992) and JONATHAN L. GROSS & STEVE RAYNER, MEASURING CULTURE 6 
(1985)). Although cultural cognition does not require application of the grid-group frame-
work, this framework does present one easily understandable method for measuring  
cultural conflict.   
 25. Though, to be fair, under another view, people who like unions could also be 
viewed as high group/high grid. This may be a generational distinction as historically un-
ions believed in a society which distributed resources based on fixed characteristics like 
seniority. Unions may be more egalitarian today. See infra note 27.  
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aside their individual wants and desires.26 Many of these same indi-
viduals also tend to believe in egalitarianism and dislike any notion 
of a ruling, corporate upper class in America.27 They support the ex-
pansion of constitutional equal protection doctrine and a robust read-
ing of federal statutory rights under equal employment opportunity 
laws.28 Finally, individuals with these values tend to believe that un-
safe work conditions and the social inequality that results from un-
equal bargaining power justify labor regulations that level the pro-
verbial playing field.29
 On the other side of this ledger, many proemployer types can be 
viewed as individuals who are high grid/low group in orientation. 
These individuals tend to embrace values such a liberty, market 
freedom, autonomy, and self-reliance.30 In the workplace context, 
these individuals dislike legal regulations because they undermine 
their vision of how to run their businesses.31 They also tend to believe 
that unions wrongly monopolize the labor market and that employers 
should not be overly constrained in running an efficient workplace.32
                                                                                                                               
 26. See J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 338 (1944) (“The practice and philosophy 
of collective bargaining looks with suspicion on . . . individual advantages.”).  
 27. See, e.g., ROBERT KUTTNER, EVERYTHING FOR SALE 100 (1997) (describing unions 
as one of society's most potent counterweights to the inequalities generated by markets 
and maintaining that unions are “a force for greater equality, because they promote[] a 
more egalitarian distribution of earnings”). 
 28. See, e.g., Marion Crain & Ken Matheny, Labor's Identity Crisis, 89 CAL. L. REV.
1767, 1781 n.85 (2001) (citing MILTON DERBER, THE AMERICAN IDEA OF INDUSTRIAL DE-
MOCRACY, 1865-1965, 95 (1970)) (“[U]nion support was essential to the passage of Title 
VII.”). 
 29. The National Labor Relations Act embodies the type of regulation that low grid-
high group individuals favor. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2006) (“The inequality of bargaining 
power between employees who do not possess full freedom of association or actual liberty of 
contract, and employers who are organized in the corporate or other forms of ownership 
association substantially burdens and affects the flow of commerce, and tends to aggravate 
recurrent business depressions, by depressing wage rates and the purchasing power of 
wage earners in industry and by preventing the stabilization of competitive wage rates and 
working conditions within and between industries.”). 
 30. In this regard, consider the recent “Tea Party” phenomenon. One Tea Party web-
site describes its movement thusly: “Participants at Tea Party protests come from all over 
the spectrum of the ideological dial, but all share the small government, ‘Don’t Tread On 
Me’ thinking that our Founders envisioned. That is the central idea . . . .”  Frequently 
Asked Questions, THE NEW TEA PARTY AND REVOLUTION, http://www.teapartyrevolution.
com/FAQ.aspx#q7 (last visited Oct. 18, 2010). 
 31. See, e.g., Thomas J. Donahue, The Mother of All Regulations, U.S. CHAMBER OF 
COMMERCE, Jan. 29, 2001, http://www.uschamber.com/press/opeds/0101donohueergo.htm  
(stating, with regard to Clinton OSHA ergonomic standards: “On January 16 [2001], the 
most costly, burdensome, and far-reaching government regulation in U.S. history took ef-
fect, marking a dangerous new government intrusion into the private-sector workplace and 
the lives of honest, hardworking Americans.”).  
 32. See, e.g., Nat’l Right to Work Legal Defense Found., Inc., Big Labor’s Top Ten 
Special Privileges (2010), http://www.nrtw.org/d/big_labor_special_privileges.htm  (“The 
Clayton Act of 1914 exempts unions from anti-monopoly laws, enabling union officials to 
forcibly drive out independent or alternative employee bargaining groups.”). 
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 Anthropological worldviews, as developed by Douglas, thus may 
help explain how different populations have divergent factual percep-
tions about risk. Furthermore, the grid/group framework works well 
to illuminate the fundamental disagreements that separate union 
members from management and employees from employers. 
2.   The Social Psychological Roots 
 Whereas anthropology categorizes people’s cultural identities 
based on worldviews, social psychology assists in explaining the me-
chanism by which individuals become attached to these worldviews. 
Specifically, social psychology posits that cultural values play a large 
role in helping people determine which state of affairs promote their 
interests.33 Four overlapping social psychological mechanisms that 
assist in explaining individuals’ attachment to different worldviews 
include: (1) cognitive-dissonance avoidance, (2) affect, (3) biased as-
similation, and (4) group polarization.34
 The avoidance of cognitive dissonance refers to the way the mind 
tries to avoid conflict in facts or ideas—whatever those facts or ideas 
are—with preexisting beliefs.35 So, we avoid cognitive dissonance by 
noting and assigning importance to instances of harm associated 
with conduct we dislike and by ignoring or minimalizing instances of 
harm associated with conduct we admire.36 Applied to the workplace 
context, a prounion individual will tend to believe that employer inti-
midation of employees during a union organizing campaign is the most 
important conduct to regulate, while simultaneously dismissing or mi-
nimalizing union intimidation of these same employees during a card-
check authorization procedure. An individual with a proemployer 
orientation would tend to believe the opposite with equal certainty.37
                                                                                                                               
 33. Kahan & Braman, supra note 9, at 171 (“The phenomenon of cultural cognition 
refers to a series of interlocking social and psychological mechanisms that induce individu-
als to conform their factual beliefs about contested policies to their cultural evaluations of 
the activities subject to regulation.”). 
 34. Id. at 155-57 (footnotes omitted). 
 35. See Spencer Weber Waller, The Law and Economics Virus, 31 CARDOZO L. REV.
367, 377 n.28 (2009) (“[A] strong precommitment to one way of thinking renders subjects 
prone to reject different approaches as untrue, regardless of the actual merits of the  
new position.”). 
 36. Kahan, supra note 17, at 120. 
 37. Indeed, much of the recent debate over whether to enact the Employee Free 
Choice Act and its card-check recognition provision can be seen as part of a larger debate 
over whether employer intimidation or union intimidation of workers is more problematic. 
Compare James Sherk, The Heritage Foundation, The Truth About Improper Firings and 
Union Intimidation, June 20, 2007, http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2007/03/
The-Truth-About-Improper-Firings-and-Union-Intimidation (“[L]abor activists regularly 
downplay the possibility that unions would intimidate workers.”), with Erin Johansson, 
American Rights at Work, Out of Control: Employer Misconduct During Organizing, Sept. 17, 
2008, http://www.americanrightsatwork.org/eye-on-the-nlrb/editions/out-of-control-employer-
misconduct-during-organizing-20080917-656-311-311.html (“Such [employer] intimidation 
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 Affect deals with the role emotions play in shaping a person’s per-
ceptions.38 Research has shown that individuals connect danger to 
activities that evoke emotions such as fear, anger, and disgust.39 This 
heuristic occurs because individuals do not have access to the neces-
sary information to form their own opinions about the issue. They 
therefore conform “their perceptions of risk to the visceral reactions 
that putatively dangerous activities evoke.”40 So, for example, some 
employers may see danger in unions because they associate unions 
with loss of profit and, perhaps, even dread mobsters infiltrating 
their businesses.41 On the other hand, employees feel anger and 
dread when fellow employees are terminated in an arbitrary manner 
under an employment-at-will regime and thus, are more likely to 
support laws and regulations that prevent this type of situation  
from occurring.  
 The third psychological mechanism, biased assimilation, refers to 
the tendency of individuals to condition their acceptance of new in-
formation as reliable based on its conformity to their prior beliefs.42
Rather than accommodating their current beliefs to new contrary in-
formation, studies suggest that people will instead discount new in-
formation if it is inconsistent with their prior views.43 This phenome-
non makes sense considering most people do not have sufficient in-
formation of their own to decide whether to believe or disbelieve new 
information. Especially where new information challenges a belief 
that is central to a person’s cultural identity, the push-back against 
new contrary information may be significant. So, for instance, new 
evidence that unions help make workplaces more profitable will be 
disbelieved by an antiunion employer, while similar proof that rais-
ing the minimum wage causes unemployment will be disregarded by 
proemployee types. 
 Finally, the phenomenon of group polarization explains how cul-
tural worldviews condition an individual’s beliefs about societal 
harms through a set of in/out-group dynamics. Again, because of a 
                                                                                                                               
includes firing union supporters, threatening to shut down the workplace even when such 
claims are unfounded, and bribing workers into voting against the union.”). 
 38. Levit, supra note 19, at 399 (“[The affect heuristic] suggests that people often base 
decisions on affective responses or feelings rather than systematic judgments.”). 
 39. See MARY DOUGLAS, PURITY AND DANGER: AN ANALYSIS OF CONCEPTS OF POLLU-
TION AND TABOO 39-40 (1966); Melissa L. Finucane et al., The Affect Heuristic in Judg-
ments of Risks and Benefits, 13 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 1 (2000). 
 40. Dan M. Kahan, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Risk Regulation, 156 U. PA. L. 
REV. 741, 743 (2008); see also Levit, supra note 19, at 400 (“People consult their own emo-
tions (visceral feelings about the goodness or badness of something) and use those as in-
formation in reaching a conclusion about an issue.”). 
 41. See Levit, supra note 19, at 426-27. 
 42. See Bryan D. Lammon, What We Talk About When We Talk About Ideology: Judi-
cial Politics Scholarship and Naive Legal Realism, 83 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 231, 275 (2009). 
 43. Id.
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lack of original information of their own, individuals tend to rely on 
those whom they trust to tell them which risk claims are serious and 
which are specious.44 So while conservatives flock to Limbaugh and 
Fox News, liberals find solace in Maddow and MSNBC. Democrats 
believe President Obama’s campaign pledges, while Republicans dis-
believe him and even call him a “liar.”45 In fact, this state of affairs is 
hardly surprising given that “[s]tates of persistent group polarization 
are . . . inevitable—almost mathematically so—as beliefs feed on 
themselves within cultural groups, whose members stubbornly dis-
miss as unworthy insights originating outside the group.”46
 In all, these social psychological mechanisms aid in describing 
how values work to change factual perceptions and behavior. Fur-
ther, the melding of Douglas’ anthropological worldviews with these 
mechanisms provides the powerful story of cultural cognition: how a 
person’s values subconsciously influence how he or she perceives the 
world and the risks within it.  
B.   Cultural Cognition Theory and the Law 
 As explained in the prior section, culture cognition theory provides 
a linkage between a person’s cultural worldview and how he or she 
interprets social harms. The observation that diverse cultural groups 
perceive risk through various cognitive lenses could have practical 
applications in numerous fields of study, but such discernment cer-
tainly has potential value in the legal arena. This is hardly surpris-
ing given that law concerns itself with the regulation and minimiza-
tion of social harms.47
 In fact, cultural cognition theory provides insight into both the 
enactment of legislation and judicial decisionmaking. For instance, 
although citizens of a country might agree that laws should generally 
increase society’s material well-being, much disagreement exists over 
which laws will lead to that desired result.48 Individuals disagree 
fiercely about which laws will achieve their desired ends as an empir-
ical matter. Two people with different cultural worldviews might 
                                                                                                                               
 44. See Albert C. Lin, Evangelizing Climate Change, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1135, 
1182-83 (2009) (“The cultural identity of an advocate can have a very powerful effect on 
how the advocate’s message is perceived.”). 
 45. See Nico Hines, Washington Turns on Obama Heckler Joe Wilson After Healthcare 
'Liar' Gibe, TIMES ONLINE, September 10, 2009, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/ 
news/world/us_and_americas/article6828905.ece (“Joe Wilson, [Congressman] of South 
Carolina, breached Washington etiquette by calling Mr[.] Obama a liar as he addressed the 
joint houses of Congress last night.”). 
 46. Kahan, supra note 17, at 125 (footnote omitted). 
 47. See Thomas McInerney, Putting Regulation Before Responsibility: Towards Bind-
ing Norms of Corporate Social Responsibility, 40 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 171, 176-77 (2007) 
(maintaining that the New Deal introduced the modern regulatory state in the United 
States with its emphasis on introducing laws to minimize the social harms of the market). 
 48. See Kahan & Braman, supra note 9, at 170-71. 
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agree that they want a safer and more secure society within which to 
live but will disagree about whether more or less nuclear power will 
achieve that desired result.49 In fact, these factual disagreements 
among individuals from different cultural worldviews have been em-
pirically shown to best explain patterns in how people disagree about 
hot-button legal and political issues.50
 A case in point is an empirical study completed by Kahan, Hoff-
man, and Braman on a recent Supreme Court case involving the al-
leged excessive use of force by police officers in a high-speed car 
chase.51 In Scott v. Harris,52 police officers conducted a harrowing 
chase of a suspect’s car through busy roads with other cars and pede-
strians present.53 The chase ended with one of the police cars inten-
tionally bumping the suspect’s car, causing it to roll over at high 
speed and rendering the suspect a quadriplegic.54 The suspect then 
sued the police department under federal civil rights law alleging 
that the use of deadly force to terminate the chase constituted an un-
reasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution.55
 What makes the case unique is that the whole car chase was cap-
tured on two different police cars’ video cameras, and the combined 
video was submitted as evidence on behalf of the police to establish 
that their conduct was reasonable under the circumstances.56 Agree-
ing with the police, Justice Scalia, for eight members of the Court,57
                                                                                                                               
 49. See Rebecca M. Bratspies, Regulatory Trust, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 575, 620 (2009) 
([D]ifferent groups respond to the suggestion that a reinvigorated nuclear energy program 
is needed to respond to global warming. For those opposed to nuclear energy, the juxtaposi-
tion of the two issues seems absurd; but to those in favor of the technology the linkage is 
obvious.”); see also Lin, supra note 44, at 1138-39 (“[R]ecognizing the role of values has 
critical implications for practical strategies for changing individual conduct, for the content 
of [the] laws to address climate change, and for presenting and justifying proposed laws 
and policies to the public.”). 
 50. See Dan M. Kahan et al., Culture and Identity-Protective Cognition: Explaining 
the White-Male Effect in Risk Perception, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 465 (2007) (showing 
that cultural worldviews more powerfully explain differences of risk perception and legally-
consequential facts than do other individual characteristics). On the other hand, empirical 
studies seeking to correlate trends in judicial decisionmaking to demographic characteris-
tics of judges are notoriously all over the place. See Chew & Kelley, supra note 7, at 1132 
(“Some [attitudinal] studies find little relationship between the judges’ attributes and their 
decision making, while others find significant patterns.”). 
 51. See Kahan et al., supra note 1, at 838. 
 52. 550 U.S. 372, 374-75 (2007). 
 53. Id. at 375. The chase lasted over six minutes and ten miles. Id.
 54. Id.
 55. Id. at 375-76.  
 56. Readers of this Article can watch the video on the Court’s website. See RealPlayer 
Video: Supreme Court of the United States, Scott v. Harris - Video (April 30, 2007), 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/media/06/scott_v_harris.rm. 
 57. Justices Breyer and Ginsburg wrote separate concurrences, but joined Justice 
Scalia’s majority decision. See Scott, 550 U.S. at 386 (Ginsburg, J., concurring); id. at 387-
89 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
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found that with the video as the primary evidence, it was impossible 
to disagree that the police acted in a reasonable manner.58 In a foot-
note, Justice Scalia further stated, “We are happy to allow the video-
tape to speak for itself.”59
 Justice Scalia’s conclusion that only one interpretation was possi-
ble after viewing the video, however, was rendered suspect by Justice 
Stevens’ dissent. Justice Stevens stated that after watching the video 
of the high speed chase he did not necessarily believe that the police 
acted in a reasonable manner.60 Rather, he mentioned that growing 
up in a different age and time made the swerving between lanes on a 
two-lane highway of the suspect’s car seem less harrowing than it 
might have seemed to others.61 He also noted the suspect had not done 
anything wrong at that point of the chase besides flee from the police.62
In all, Justice Stevens challenged the majority’s interpretation of the 
videotape and found that the case should be submitted to a jury be-
cause reasonable fact finders could disagree over whether the police 
used excessive force against the suspect in these circumstances.63
                                                                                                                               
 58. Id. at 381 (“Judging the matter on that basis, we think it is quite clear that Depu-
ty Scott did not violate the Fourth Amendment.”); see also id. at 383-84 (“Although there is 
no obvious way to quantify the risks on either side, it is clear from the videotape that res-
pondent posed an actual and imminent threat to the lives of any pedestrians who might 
have been present, to other civilian motorists, and to the officers involved in the chase.”). 
 59. Id. at 378 n.5. 
 60. Id. at 390 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Rather than supporting the conclusion that 
what we see on the video ‘resembles a Hollywood-style car chase of the most frightening 
sort,’ . . . the tape actually confirms, rather than contradicts, the lower courts’ appraisal of 
the factual questions at issue.”).  
 61. Id. at 390 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Had they learned to drive when most high-
speed driving took place on two-lane roads rather than on superhighways-when split-second 
judgments about the risk of passing a slow-poke in the face of oncoming traffic were routine—
they might well have reacted to the videotape more dispassionately.”). The Eleventh Circuit 
similarly found, “[T]aking the facts from the non-movant's viewpoint, [respondent] remained 
in control of his vehicle, slowed for turns and intersections, and typically used his indicators 
for turns. He did not run any motorists off the road. . . . Nor was he a threat to pedestrians in 
the shopping center parking lot, which was free from pedestrian and vehicular traffic as the 
center was closed. Significantly, by the time the parties were back on the highway and Scott 
rammed [respondent], the motorway had been cleared of motorists and pedestrians allegedly 
because of police blockades of the nearby intersections.” Harris v. Coweta County, Ga., 433 
F.3d 807, 815-16 (11th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted).  
 62. Harris, 550 U.S. at 393 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“I recognize, of course, that even 
though respondent's original speeding violation on a four-lane highway was rather ordi-
nary, his refusal to stop and subsequent flight was a serious offense that merited severe 
punishment. It was not, however, a capital offense, or even an offense that justified the use 
of deadly force rather than an abandonment of the chase.”).  
 63. Id. at 391 (“A jury could certainly conclude that those motorists were exposed to 
no greater risk than persons who take the same action in response to a speeding ambul-
ance, and that their reactions were fully consistent with the evidence that respondent, 
though speeding, retained full control of his vehicle.”); see also id. at 395 (“Whether a per-
son's actions have risen to a level warranting deadly force is a question of fact best re-
served for a jury. Here, the Court has usurped the jury's factfinding function and, in doing 
so, implicitly labeled the four other judges to review the case unreasonable.”). 
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 Based on the fact pattern of this case, Dan Kahan, David Hoff-
man, and Donald Braman set out to empirically determine whether 
Justice Scalia’s challenge about the videotape could be met and 
whether cognitive illiberalism best explained the nature of the opi-
nion.64 Taking a diverse demographic sample of 1350 American citi-
zens, which included hierarchs and communitarians as well as indivi-
dualists and egalitarians, the authors showed the high-speed chase 
video from Scott v. Harris and asked them a number of questions.65
Although most of the respondents agreed with Justice Scalia’s inter-
pretation of the video tape,66 a surprising number of individuals, par-
ticularly from defined cultural subcommunities, agreed with Justice 
Steven’s dissent that the video did not necessarily speak for itself.67
 More specifically, the authors found that “African Americans, low-
income workers . . . [and] individuals who characterized themselves 
as liberals and Democrats . . . share[d] a cultural orientation that 
prize[d] egalitarianism and social solidarity,”68 and therefore, agreed 
with Justice Stevens that the propolice outcome of the case was 
troubling.69 On the other hand, the cultural profile of the group who 
agreed with Justice Scalia held “individualistic and hierarchic 
worldviews and associated political commitments [that] tend[ed] to 
approve of highly punitive responses to law-breaking . . . .”70 This lat-
ter group believed that the Supreme Court majority decided the case 
correctly when they found the police acted appropriately under all  
the circumstances.71
                                                                                                                               
 64. Kahan et al., supra note 1, at 838.
 65. Id. at 841. Kahan and his coauthors utilized the same classifications to identify 
the cultural worldview of different groups based on the system first developed by Douglas. 
Id. at 859-60. The authors also classified the different type of surveys individuals as either 
aleph or bet research subjects. Id. at 862. Aleph research subjects “morally disapprove of 
challenges to lawful authority and defiance of dominant norms,” while bet subjects’ “egali-
tarian worldviews and left-leaning political sensibilities can be expected to incline [them] 
to condemn authority figures for abuses of power much more readily than they condemn 
putative deviants for defying authority.” Id. at 863-64. 
 66. Id. at 879 (“A very sizable majority of our diverse, nationally representative sam-
ple agreed with the Scott majority that Harris's driving exposed the public and the police to 
lethal risks, that Harris was more at fault than the police for putting the public in danger, 
and that deadly force ultimately was reasonable to terminate the chase.”). 
 67. Id. at 841.  
 68. Id.
 69. Id. at 879 (“Individuals who hold egalitarian and communitarian views, whose 
politics are liberal, who are well educated but likely less affluent, and whose ranks include 
disproportionately more African Americans and women, in contrast, were significantly 
more likely to form pro-plaintiff views and to reject the conclusion that the police acted 
reasonably in using deadly force to terminate the chase.”).  
 70. Id. at 863; see also id. at 879 (“Individuals (particularly white males) who hold 
hierarchical and individualist cultural worldviews, who are politically conservative, who 
are affluent, and who reside in the West were likely to form significantly more pro-
defendant risk perceptions.”). 
 71. Id. at 863. 
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 Kahan, Hoffman, and Braman argue that Justice Scalia’s opinion 
for the majority in Scott constituted a “type of decisionmaking hubris 
that has cognitive origins and that has deleterious consequences that 
extend far beyond the Court’s decision in Scott.”72 In these scenarios, 
the question becomes “whose eyes the law should believe when identi-
fiable groups of citizens form competing factual perceptions.”73 The 
Article concludes by taking issue with Justice Scalia’s insistence that 
there was only one reasonable view of the Scott v. Harris facts, even 
with the presence of the videotape. Justice Scalia suffered from cog-
nitive illiberalism, the authors maintain, because of his inability to 
recognize the connection between his own perceptions of social risks 
and the contestable nature of his views about what constitutes an 
ideal society.74 Justice Scalia’s legal method for deciding Scott v. Har-
ris also “incur[s] [a] cost to democratic legitimacy associated with 
labeling the perspective of persons who share a particular cultural 
identity ‘unreasonable’ and hence unworthy of consideration in the 
adjudicatory process.”75 However, by taking steps to counteract this 
bias, Kahan, Hoffman, and Braman suggest that courts can divest 
the law of culturally partisan overtones that detract from the law's 
legitimacy.76
 To this point, no article has considered the application of cultural 
cognition theory and the presence of cognitive illiberalism to judicial 
decisions in the labor and employment law context.77 In the next 
                                                                                                                               
 72. Id. at 842. 
 73. Id. at 841.  
 74. Id. at 842-43 (“[Social psychology] tells us that although our ability to perceive 
this type of value-motivated cognition in others is quite acute, our power to perceive it in 
ourselves tends to be quite poor.” (citing Robert J. Robinson, Dacher Keltner, Andrew Ward 
& Lee Ross, Actual Versus Assumed Differences in Construal: “Naive Realism” in Inter-
group Perception and Conflict, 68 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 404, 414-16 (1995))). 
 75. Kahan et al., supra note 1, at 842. 
 76. See id. at 843 (“Judges, legislators, and ordinary citizens should therefore always 
be alert to the influence of this species of ‘cognitive illiberalism’ and take the precautions 
necessary to minimize it.”). To be clear, in this Article, I do not seek to psychoanalyze the 
Justices or analyze the motives of any judge. It makes no sense to look at a particular indi-
vidual and say that a particular perception on his or her part involves “cultural cognition,” 
as the theory is best understood as a phenomenon of collective decisionmaking. Rather, 
this Article offers an account of how we, as observers of judges’ decisions, make sense of 
what is going on in those decisions. Yet, to avoid awkwardness in exposition in the analysis 
below, the Article frequently talks about the Justices’ reasoning as if we could see cultural 
cognition operating in judges’ minds. (I am indebted to Dan Kahan for helping me to clarify 
my thoughts on this important point.). 
 77. On the other hand, James Atleson long ago noted in traditional labor law cases 
the importance of judicial perception of facts and how they reflect previously held values 
and assumptions, rather than record evidence. See generally JAMES B. ATLESON, VALUES
AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW (1983). See also GARY MINDA, BOYCOTT IN
AMERICA: HOW IMAGINATION AND IDEOLOGY SHAPE THE LEGAL MIND (1999) (concluding 
that judges' views of boycotts have been shaped by metaphors used to describe boycotts). 
Additionally, other recent empirical studies suggest that judges harbor implicit biases 
similar to those that exist in the general population. See, e.g., Chris Guthrie et al., Blinking 
on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2007) (positing judicial 
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Part, this Article considers the insights that cultural cognition theory 
can bring to courts deciding controversial types of labor and employ-
ment law disputes by analyzing two specific controversies—one in 
traditional labor law, the other in public employment law. In subse-
quent Parts, it then takes up the challenge of Kahan and his coau-
thors to spell out the precautions necessary to reduce the amount of 
cultural conflict in labor and employment law decisions. It does this 
by considering potential social science and legal techniques for rid-
ding legal decisions of delegitimizing bias and simultaneously mak-
ing them more acceptable to a larger segment of society. 
III.   CULTURAL COGNITION IN ACTION: LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW 
CASE STUDIES
 Whereas the empirical study of reactions to the chase videotape in 
Scott v. Harris focused on the cultural biases of individuals, this Pa-
per focuses on the role these biases may play in fashioning judicial 
decisions in closely contested labor and employment law cases.78 This 
shift of emphasis aids in considering how cultural attitudes of judges 
may provide a method for understanding larger policy debates among 
citizens in society.79 Consequently, the specific cultural debates being 
played out in the courtrooms of this country become magnified when 
                                                                                                                               
“intuitive-override” model of decisionmaking based on empirical research); Jeffrey J. Rach-
linski, et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1195, 1205, 1221 (2009) (authors administered Race Implicit Assumption Test (IAT) to 133 
white and black trial court judges from three jurisdictions in different parts of the U.S. and 
found that they harbored implicit biases that may have some bearing upon their judg-
ment). See also Edward A. Adams, Race & Gender of Judges Make Enormous Differences in 
Rulings, Studies Find, A.B.A. JOURNAL, Feb. 6, 2010, http://www.abajournal.com 
/weekly/article/race_gender_of_judges_make_enormous_differences_in_rulings_studies_fin
d_aba (“In federal racial harassment cases, one study . . . found that plaintiffs lost just 54 
percent of the time when the judge handling the case was an African-American. Yet plain-
tiffs lost 81 percent of the time when the judge was Hispanic, 79 percent when the judge 
was white, and 67 percent of the time when the judge was Asian American.” (citing Chew 
& Kelley, supra note 7)); Kristin A. Lane et al., Implicit Social Cognition and Law, 3 ANN.
REV. L. SOC. SCI. 427, 431 (2007) (describing how IAT tests measure latency responses to 
diverse racially oriented stimuli); Jennifer L. Peresie, Note, Females Judges Matter: Gend-
er and Collegial Decisionmaking in the Federal Appellate Courts, 114 YALE L.J. 1759, 1761 
(2005) (“[E]mpirical analysis of 556 federal appellate cases decided in 1999, 2000, and 2001 
reveal[ed] that judges’ gender mattered to case outcomes. Though plaintiffs lost in the vast 
majority of cases, they were twice as likely to prevail when a female judge was on the 
bench.”).  
 78. See Kahan, supra note 12, at 421 (arguing that if cultural cognition operates when 
ordinary people make sense of ambiguous facts, then “it’s plausible that it’s what happens 
with judges when they have to do so in cases”); see also Rachlinski et al., supra note 77.  
 79. See Kahan & Braman, supra note 9, at 167 (“For many citizens, men and women 
in white lab coats speak with less authority than (mostly) men and women in black 
frocks.”). 
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such arguments are given substantial weight because of the esteem 
in which judges are held in the United States.80
 To more specifically understand what cultural cognition theory 
can tell us about the judicial disputes in labor and employment law 
cases, this Article applies the theory to two such controversial cases 
by the United States Supreme Court. The first case, NLRB v. Curtin 
Matheson Scientific, Inc.,81 involves the issue of whether striker re-
placement workers should be presumed to hold pro- or antiunion sen-
timents. The second case, Engquist v. Oregon Department of Agricul-
ture,82 explores a completely different aspect of employment law, con-
cerning a contested constitutional interpretation of equal protection 
doctrine in the public employment context. 
A.   NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc. 
 In the first case, NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., the 
United States Supreme Court, in a closely divided opinion,83 rea-
soned that the antiunion bias of striker replacements84 could not be 
presumed and that this determination had to be made on a case-by-
case basis.85 The specific facts of the case established that the em-
ployer unilaterally withdrew recognition after hiring twenty-nine 
permanent replacement employees to replace twenty-two strikers.86
Subsequently, the employer refused to bargain with the incumbent 
union maintaining that it had the necessary doubt that the union no 
longer had the support of the majority of workers in the bargaining 
unit.87 The Court held that the National Labor Relations Board 
                                                                                                                               
 80. Id. at 151 (“[Individuals] have to take the word of those whom they trust on issues of 
what sorts of empirical claims, and what sorts of data supporting such claims, are credible.”). 
 81. 494 U.S. 775 (1990). 
 82. 128 S. Ct. 2146 (2008). 
 83. The five-to-four decision produced four separate opinions, including the majority 
opinion by Justice Marshall (joined by Justices Brennan, White, and Stevens), a concur-
rence by Chief Justice Rehnquist, and separate dissents by Justice Blackmun and Justice 
Scalia (joined by Justices O’Connor and Kennedy). In this article, I focus only on the opi-
nions by Justice Marshall, 494 U.S. at 775-96, and Justice Scalia, 494 U.S. at 801-19. 
 84. A striker replacement is a person who is hired to replace union workers who are 
on strike. This type of employer response to union concerted activity has long been permit-
ted under the doctrine of NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938). See also
NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 232 (1963) (reaffirming the validity of the re-
placement worker doctrine). 
 85. Curtin Matheson, 494 U.S. at 793 (“Even if replacements often do not support the 
union . . . , it was not irrational for the Board to conclude that the probability of replacement 
opposition to the union is insufficient to justify an antiunion presumption.”). In teaching this 
case in labor law class, I sometimes point to the so-called “Billy Elliott” scenario in which one-
time strikers cross picket lines and become “scabs” to provide for their families’ needs (and 
even tuition for a son’s dance class). See LEE HALL, BILLY ELLIOT (2000). 
 86. Curtin Matheson, 494 U.S. at 782. 
 87. Id. At the time of the refusal to bargain in Curtin Matheson, the bargaining unit 
consisted of nineteen strikers, twenty-five permanent replacements and five employees who 
had crossed the picket line. Based on these numbers, the employer assumed that there were 
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(NLRB or Board) had acted appropriately within its discretion to not 
adopt the replacement worker antiunion presumption.88 The presence 
or absence of this presumption was critical in determining whether 
the company could unilaterally withdraw recognition from the in-
cumbent union consistent with the National Labor Relations Act 
(NLRA).89
 Under the NLRA at the time, a company could only withdraw rec-
ognition if it had “good faith doubt” based on “objective considera-
tions”90 that a majority of workers no longer supported the union.91 If 
the replacement workers could be placed on the antiunion side of the 
ledger, a company could conceivably provoke a strike, hire enough 
replacement workers so that the union would no longer enjoy majori-
ty support,92 and then have a group of antiunion employees file a de-
certification petition to rid itself of the union, making the statutory 
right to strike illusory.93 One of the dissents, written by Justice Sca-
lia, focused on the inevitable antagonism between strikers and re-
placement workers and concluded that it was lawful for an employer 
to withdraw recognition based on its reasonable doubt that the union 
still had majority support with these replacement workers  
in place.94
 To better understand the manner in which Justice Marshall for 
the majority and Justice Scalia in his dissent were disagreeing over 
                                                                                                                               
twenty-four workers for the union and twenty-five against. There was some debate whether 
the five who crossed the picket line could be presumed to be antiunion. Id. at 782-83. 
 88. Id. at 788 (“We find the Board’s no-presumption approach rational as an  
empirical matter.”). 
 89. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2006). 
 90. See Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96 (1954); Bartenders Ass’n, 213 N.L.R.B. 651, 651 
(1974). 
 91. See Celanese Corp. of America, 95 N.L.R.B. 664, 672 (1951). Presently, an employ-
er may only unilaterally withdraw recognition where the union has actually lost the sup-
port of the majority of the bargaining unit. See Levitz Furniture Co. of the Pacific, 333 
N.L.R.B. 717 (2001) (responding to Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 
359 (1998), adopting a more demanding standard for an employer’s unilateral withdrawal 
of recognition from an incumbent union); see also Sarah Pawlicki, Levitz Furniture Co.:
The End of Celanese and the Good-Faith Doubt Standard for Withdrawing Recognition of 
Incumbent Unions, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 381 (2003). The exact standard now in existence, 
however, is not relevant to the focus of this Article about how judges have interpreted le-
gally consequential facts in controversial labor and employment decisions.     
 92. The NLRA requires that “[r]epresentatives designated or selected for the purposes 
of collective bargaining [be appointed] by the majority of the employees in a unit appropri-
ate for such purposes.” 29 U.S.C. § 159(a). The importance of this majoritarian principle 
becomes clearer when one considers that a union so designated is deemed the “exclusive 
representative of all the employees in such unit . . . .” Id.
 93. The statutory right to strike is found in Section 13 of the NLRA. 29 U.S.C § 163 
(“Nothing in this subchapter, except as specifically provided for herein, shall be construed 
so as either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike, or to 
affect the limitations or qualifications on that right.”). 
 94. NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 494 U.S. 775, 801-02 (1990) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
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legally consequential facts in this area of labor law, it is first neces-
sary to review the withdrawal of recognition labor law doctrine. 
 1.   Employer Withdrawal of Union Recognition Generally 
 This debate surrounding whether striker replacements must be 
presumed to be antiunion in their outlook, takes place in the larger 
context of deciding when an employer may unilaterally withdrawal 
recognition from a union that currently represents a unit of the com-
pany’s employees. Unions are entitled to an irrebuttable presumption 
of majority support for one year after being certified by the NLRB 
(“certification bar”),95 one year after a representation election (“elec-
tion bar”),96 and up to three years after the conclusion of a collective 
bargaining agreement (“contract bar”).97 If the employer refuses to 
bargain with the union during that time, it is a per se unfair labor 
practice (ULP) under Sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(5) of the NLRA.98
 Thereafter, the presumption becomes a rebuttable one, and a 
unionized employer has a number of ways to establish that the in-
cumbent union no longer enjoys majority support.99 On the one hand, 
a group of antiunion employees can file a Recognition Method (RM) 
petition seeking to decertify the union through a formal, Board-
supervised election.100 On the other hand, the employer can attempt 
to unilaterally withdraw recognition and cease to recognize and bar-
gain with the union as the bargaining representative of its employees 
based on good faith doubt.101 Not surprisingly, because of the uncer-
tainties that come with any secret ballot election, employers histori-
cally used the unilateral withdrawal route and much controversy has 
                                                                                                                               
 95. See Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27, 37 (1987). 
 96. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3). 
 97. See Mathews Readymix, Inc. v. NLRB, 165 F.3d 74, 77 (D.C. Cir. 1999). A volun-
tary recognition bar also exists, which is currently in a state of flux. See In re Dana Corp., 
351 N.L.R.B. 434 (2007) (limiting voluntary recognition bar of usually six months by not 
imposing this bar until after forty-five days have expired without the filing of a valid decer-
tification petition). Gissel bargaining order bars also sometimes come into play. See Lee 
Lumber & Bldg. Material Corp. v. NLRB, 310 F.3d 209, 213 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (permitting a 
“reasonable period” of time for union to maintain irrebuttable presumption of majority 
status after receiving a bargaining order). 
 98. See Terrell Mach. Co., 173 N.L.R.B. 1480, 1480 (1969) (citing Celanese Corp. of 
Am., 95 N.L.R.B. 664, 671-72 (1951)) (“This presumption is designed to promote stability in 
collective-bargaining relationships, without impairing the free choice of employees.”). 
 99. The burden of rebutting the union's majority status is on the employer. See Levitz 
Furniture Co. of the Pac., 333 N.L.R.B. 717 (2001). 
 100. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1)(A). 
 101. See Joan Flynn, The Costs and Benefits of “Hiding the Ball”: NLRB Policymaking 
and the Failure of Judicial Review, 75 B.U. L. REV. 387, 394-95 (1995) (discussing Board's 
application of the good faith doubt approach). This doubt must be based on “objective con-
siderations,” and the employer’s refusal to bargain must not be intended “to undermine the 
union.” Bartenders Ass’n of Pocatello, 213 N.L.R.B. 651, 651 (1974). Essentially, not in-
tended “to undermine the union” means the refusal to bargain must be advanced free of 
associated employer ULPs. See Station KKHI, 284 N.L.R.B. 1339 (1987).  
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existed over what showing the employer needed to make to meet  
this standard.102
2.   Withdrawal of Union Recognition in Striker Replacement  
Scenario 
 Curtin Matheson concerned the latter way of proving that the un-
ion no longer enjoyed majority status among the employees it 
represented—by showing it had a “good-faith doubt” based on “objec-
tive considerations.” The objective considerations needed to form the 
good faith doubt in Curtin Matheson involved the employer’s belief 
that striker replacements who crossed the picket line to take striking 
workers’ jobs could be reasonably presumed not to support the un-
ion.103
 In his majority opinion, Justice Marshall noted that new em-
ployees who are hired in nonstrike situations are presumed to sup-
port the incumbent union “in the same proportion as the employees 
they replace.”104 On the other hand, the law has been inconsistent in 
evaluating the views of replacement workers who were hired in strike 
situations.105 By 1987, however, the Board, in the Station KKHI case, 
had come to conclude that no universal generalizations could be made 
about whether striker replacements supported or opposed the union 
and settled on a “no presumption” rule in these cases.106
 The Board maintained “that the pro-union presumption lacked 
empirical foundation because ‘incumbent unions and strikers some-
                                                                                                                               
 102. See, e.g., Joan Flynn, A Triple Standard at the NLRB: Employer Challenges to an 
Incumbent Union, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 653, 678-79 (1991) (maintaining that “high employee 
turnover, a small or declining number of union members or employees authorizing union 
dues deductions, employee disinterest in union activity, inactivity on the union’s part . . . 
and employee statements regarding other employees’ opposition to the union” does not 
constitute the required good-faith doubt (footnotes omitted)). 
 103. NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 494 U.S. 775, 782 (1990); see also RO-
BERT GORMAN, LABOR LAW, UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 112 (1976) (“[I]f a 
new hire agrees to serve as a replacement for a striker (in union parlance, as a strike-
breaker, or worse), it is generally assumed that he does not support the union and that he 
ought not be counted toward a union majority.”). Justice Marshall takes issue with the 
appellate court that this statement by Professor Gorman actually endorses an antiunion 
presumption in these cases and instead, merely restates the Board law at the time it was 
written. See Curtin Matheson, 494 U.S. at 785 n.6.  
 104. Curtin Matheson, 494 U.S. at 779 (citing Nat’l Plastic Prods. Co., 78 N.L.R.B. 699, 
706 (1948)).  
 105. Compare Curtin Matheson, 494 U.S. at 779 (collecting cases showing that the 
Board from 1959-1968 thought it reasonable to assume that replacement workers were not 
union adherents), and Peoples Gas Sys., Inc., 214 N.L.R.B. 944 (1974) (recognizing it is 
possible that striker replacements could be prounion, while reasonableness of the employ-
er’s view that replacement’s support of unions maybe weaker given their willingness to 
cross union picket lines), with Cutten Supermarket, 220 N.L.R.B. 507, 509 (1975) (treating 
new employees and striker replacements the same in presuming that they support the 
union); Windham Cmty. Mem. Hosp., 230 N.L.R.B. 1070, 1070 (1977) (reaffirming the Cut-
ten holding); and Pennco, Inc., 250 N.L.R.B. 716, 717-18 (1980) (same). 
 106. Station KKHI, 284 N.L.R.B. at 1341. 
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times have shown hostility toward the permanent replacements,’ and 
‘replacements are typically aware of the union’s primary concern for 
the striker's welfare, rather than that of the replacements.’ ”107
Equally, however, the antiunion presumption was unsupportable fac-
tually because striker replacements may just not approve of the spe-
cific strike or face financial problems, even though they would nor-
mally support the union.108 Finally, the Court noted the Board’s re-
luctance, due to policy reasons, to adopt a presumption that would 
further undermine the employees’ right to strike.109 In the end, then, 
the Board decided to adopt a no-presumption rule and require inde-
pendent evidence on a case-by-case basis of replacement workers’ 
sentiments toward the union.110
 After reviewing current Board law, the Court began its analysis 
by restating the initial rebuttable presumption that employees sup-
port the union in these cases.111 The burden is then on the employer 
to rebut the presumption of majority union support through good 
faith doubt based on objective considerations.112 Critically, then, Jus-
tice Marshall in the majority decision rejects the employer’s argu-
ment that the Board must adopt “a second, subsidiary presumption—
that replacement employees oppose the union.”113 Such an approach 
would be inconsistent with the requirement that the good faith doubt 
of the employer in unilaterally withdrawing recognition from the un-
ion be based on objective considerations—under the antiunion pre-
sumption “the employer would not need to offer any objective evi-
dence of the employees’ union sentiments to rebut the presumption of 
the union's continuing majority status.”114 Therefore, the majority 
decision concludes that the Board’s refusal to adopt the antiunion 
presumption was rational and consistent with the NLRA.115 Because 
such evidence of antiunion orientation among the replacement work-
ers was lacking,116 the Court affirmed the Board’s decision—that the 
employer had committed an unfair labor practice when it had with-
drawn recognition from the union.117
                                                                                                                               
 107. Curtin Matheson, 494 U.S. at 781 (quoting Station KKHI, 284 N.L.R.B. at 1344). 
 108. Id.
 109. Id. (“[A]doption of an antiunion presumption would ‘substantially impair the em-
ployees' right to strike by adding to the risk of replacement the risk of loss of the bargain-
ing representative as soon as replacements equal in number to the strikers are willing to 
cross the picket line.’ ”). 
 110. Id. at 781-82. This part of the decision appears to consist of a legislative factfind-
ing. An interesting and complex question that this Article does not explore is what the 
interaction is between cultural cognition and legislative factfinding. 
 111. Id. at 787. 
 112. Id.
 113. Id.
 114. Id.
 115. Id. at 788, 796.  
 116. Id. at 784-85. 
 117. Id. at 796. 
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3.   Curtin Matheson Through the Prism of Cultural Cognition 
Theory 
 Recall now that cultural cognition theory teaches that judges’ val-
ues play a subconscious role in the way that they interpret facts.118
Curtin Matheson is all about facts; as Justice Marshall points out: 
“We find the Board’s no-presumption approach rational as an empiri-
cal matter.”119 In this sense, Justice Marshall appears to be privileg-
ing one view concerning whether strike replacements generally have 
an antiunion or prounion view in the replacement worker context.  
 Note, however, that Marshall’s decision does not amount to the 
same “decisionmaking hubris” that Justice Scalia was guilty of in the 
Scott v. Harris decision,120 and it instead recognizes that there are 
different ways to interpret the facts in a case such as this one. Note 
also that Justice Marshall must engage in an evaluation of the facts 
from a particular cultural standpoint because, short of taking an un-
likely survey of replacement workers who cross picket lines, it is im-
possible to know for sure their prounion or antiunion orientation.121
 Justice Scalia, for his part, does not appear to view his reading of 
the facts as merely one possible interpretation. Like his opinion in 
Scott v. Harris, he writes from the vantage point that “no reasonable 
person” could possibly disagree with the proposition that good-faith 
doubt of continuing union majority status could be based on replace-
ment workers holding antiunion views.122 Justice Scalia claims that a 
necessary and eternal conflict exists between union members and 
replacement workers as a result of unions seeking to have replace-
ment workers discharged when the strike is over.123  To Justice Sca-
                                                                                                                               
 118. See Kahan & Braman, supra note 9, at 167 (“[C]ultural cognition operates as an 
information-processing filter.”).  
 119. Curtin Matheson, 494 U.S. at 788. 
 120. Kahan et al., supra note 1, at 842.
 121. Interestingly, from the Board standpoint, the good-faith doubt standard was never 
supposed to be a search for the subjective sentiments of replacements, but a rule that em-
ployers should not be able to rid themselves of unions merely by hiring replacements work-
ers. See Station KKHI, 284 N.L.R.B. 1339, 1344 (1987). Yet, in the hands of the Supreme 
Court, the subjective sentiments of replacement workers are clearly central to the  
Justices’ disagreement.  
 122. See Curtin Matheson, 494 U.S. at 801 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Since the principal 
employment-related interest of strike replacements (to retain their jobs) is almost invaria-
bly opposed to the principal interest of the striking union (to replace them with its striking 
members) it seems to me impossible to conclude on this record that the employer did not 
have a reasonable, good-faith doubt regarding the union’s majority status.”). 
 123. Id. A further point in support of this general proposition is the use of the deroga-
tory term “scab” to refer to those who cross the picket line. Here are the famous words of 
the union adherent, Jack London, on the worth of “scabs”:  
After God had finished the rattlesnake, the toad, and the vampire, he had some 
awful substance left with which he made a scab. A scab is a two-legged animal 
with a corkscrew soul, a water brain, a combination backbone of jelly and glue.  
Jack London, The Scab (1902).  
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lia, it therefore makes “plain” sense to presume replacement workers 
have an antiunion outlook.  
 Yet, such an analysis unnecessarily alienates cultural subcom-
munities and delegitimizes the law for a segment of society.124 Like in 
Scott v. Harris, Justice Scalia simply does not consider that there 
might be cultural subcommunities that disagree with his assessment 
of the pertinent facts because of their different cultural commit-
ments.125 And perhaps Justice Scalia’s argumentative approach in his 
dissent in Curtin Matheson is really not all that surprising because 
cultural cognition theory teaches that judges gravitate toward factual 
beliefs that are most congenial to their existing values—this is cogni-
tive illiberalism.126 Especially in this type of labor law case where 
there is necessarily speculation about what motivates the replace-
ment worker to cross the picket line (and the evidence must remain 
somewhat inconclusive), judges become motivated, understandably, 
to find conduct they see as praiseworthy as also socially beneficial.127
 Although it is not possible to say what thoughts crossed Justice 
Scalia’s mind when he wrote his dissent in Curtin Matheson, its as-
sertions certainly would seem to appeal to individuals with individu-
alistic and hierarchical conceptions of the world. Under this view, 
individual replacement workers are praiseworthy in working to se-
cure jobs that they would otherwise not have if the union were in 
complete control of the situation. Moreover, it is good that employers 
be able to exercise their managerial prerogative to unilaterally with-
draw recognition from the union as long as they establish the rela-
tively low standard of good faith doubt since employers, after all, 
                                                                                                                               
 124. Consider the heated language Justice Scalia employs in disagreeing with the ma-
jority opinion: “Also embarrassingly wide of the mark is the Court's observation that 
‘[u]nions do not inevitably demand displacement of all strike replacements.’ ” Curtin Ma-
theson, 494 U.S. at 808 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also id. at 812 (“I reiterate that the bur-
den upon the employer here was not to demonstrate 100% assurance that a majority of the 
bargaining unit did not support the union, but merely ‘reasonable doubt’ that they did so. 
It seems to me absurd to deny that it sustained that burden.”). Justice Scalia could have 
made both of these points without disparaging his opponent’s argument. By choosing oth-
erwise, he unnecessarily delegitimizes the cultural subgroups who agree with Justice Mar-
shall’s version of the facts. See infra Part V (discussing methods for counteracting cognitive 
illiberalism in judges). 
 125. See Curtin Matheson, 494 U.S. at 805 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The precise ques-
tion presented is whether there was substantial evidence to support this factual finding. 
There plainly was not.”). 
 126. See Kahan & Braman, supra note 9, at 151 (maintaining under cultural cognition 
theory that people’s views of conduct “will inevitably be guided by their cultural evalua-
tions of these activities”).  
 127. This psychological orientation of individuals can be called “naïve realism” or “cogni-
tive illiberalism.” Kahan et al., supra note 1, at 843, 895. It is the “overconfidence in the un-
assailable correctness of the factual perceptions we hold in common with our confederates 
and unwarranted contempt for the perceptions associated with our opposites.” Id. at 843. 
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should be deferred to in the workplace.128 By benefiting employers in 
this manner in the labor law context, the opinion is filled with hie-
rarchical ideas about how a workplace should be run. The opinion 
appears antagonistic to any outcome that would support the conti-
nuance of union representation, since unions undermine the right of 
employers to run their businesses as they deem best and bring unne-
cessary regulation to the company. Now, all of this is not to imply 
that Justice Marshall’s majority opinion is a paragon of how a cultu-
rally aware opinion should be written by a judge in a labor and em-
ployment law case. Yet, Justice Marshall’s majority opinion in Curtin 
Matheson more closely approaches an understanding that there ac-
tually can be disagreement about the empirical reality of the re-
placement worker situation. By discounting both the prounion pre-
sumption and antiunion presumption in favor of a no-presumption 
rule, his opinion indicates an understanding that different cultural 
communities might view the relevant facts differently.129 Neverthe-
less, his majority decision is very much written for individuals with 
egalitarian and communitarian commitments when he sees the reali-
ty of the situation in a way that allows unions to continue to effec-
tively strike (and he expressly condones that policy goal),130 while at 
the same time allowing unions to keep their privileged, exclusive rep-
resentative status in the workplace. 
 In short, the manner in which legally-consequential facts are in-
terpreted in Curtin Matheson is consistent with Justices Marshall 
and Scalia’s prior cultural commitments. In this sense, culture is in-
deed prior to facts as culture cognition theory suggests. 
B.   Engquist v. Oregon Department of Agriculture 
 Whereas Curtin Matheson involved an issue of statutory interpre-
tation under the NLRA, Engquist v. Oregon Department of Agricul-
                                                                                                                               
 128. This concept of “managerial prerogative” finds resonance in Lawrence Rosenthal’s use 
of the term in the public employee free speech context. See Lawrence Rosenthal, The Emerging 
First Amendment Law of Managerial Prerogative, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 33, 49 (2008).  
 129. Particularly note the use by Justice Marshall of words like “may,” “in some cir-
cumstances,” and “otherwise,” to indicate his understanding that different groups may 
understand the motives of replacement workers differently. See Curtin Matheson, 494 U.S. 
at 789 (“Although replacements often may not favor the incumbent union, the Board rea-
sonably concluded, in light of its long experience in addressing these issues, that replace-
ments may in some circumstances desire union representation despite their willingness to 
cross the picket line. Economic concerns, for instance, may force a replacement employee to 
work for a struck employer even though he otherwise supports the union and wants the 
benefits of union representation.”).  
 130. Id. at 794 (“The Board’s approach to determining the union views of strike re-
placements is directed at this same goal because it limits employers’ ability to oust a union 
without adducing any evidence of the employees’ union sentiments and encourages nego-
tiated solutions to strikes.”). 
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ture131 involves a constitutional interpretation of the equal protection 
doctrine in the public employment law context. In another closely di-
vided Supreme Court case, the Court held in Engquist that a “class-
of-one” equal protection claim does not exist for public employees.132
The facts of the case were fairly straightforward and common: a per-
sonality dispute existed between a worker and new supervisor, who 
replaced an agreeable old supervisor, in a public-sector workplace.133
In addition to other constitutional and statutory claims, the employee 
sued her state employer under the Equal Protection Clause, arguing 
that her termination was for “ ‘arbitrary, vindictive, and malicious 
reasons.’ ”134 Put differently, even under rational basis review, the 
employee alleged that the State’s adverse employment actions were 
without any rational basis and solely for arbitrary reasons and thus, 
violated the Equal Protection Clause.135 The jury agreed with the em-
ployee on this class-of-one equal protection claim and she was 
awarded $175,000 in compensatory damages and $250,000 in puni-
tive damages.136
 Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the majority, overturned the 
jury’s verdict, finding that public employees cannot bring such class-
of-one claims.137 He reasoned that the class-of-one theory was simply 
a “poor fit” for public employment and public employees only had 
equal protection claims if class-based discrimination existed.138 He 
also based his holding on the need for greater latitude for the gov-
ernment in its employment role to maintain control and discipline in 
the workplace.139 The dissent by Justice Stevens maintained, howev-
er, that no compelling reasons existed for not applying the usual ra-
tional basis review to employment actions by the government.140
 1.   The History of the “Class-of-One” Equal Protection Doctrine 
 For those most familiar with reading about equal protection cases 
involving heightened judicial scrutiny because of a suspect classifica-
                                                                                                                               
 131. 128 S. Ct. 2146 (2008). The six-to-three decision produced two opinions, including 
the majority opinion by Chief Justice Roberts (joined by Justices Scalia, Thomas, Alito, 
Kennedy, and Breyer) and a dissenting opinion by Justice Stevens (joined by Justices 
Ginsberg and Souter). 
 132. Id. at 2148-49 (“We hold that such a ‘class-of-one’ theory of equal protection has no 
place in the public employment context.”). 
 133. Id. at 2149. 
 134. Id.
 135. Id. at 2149-50. 
 136. Id.
 137.  Id. at 2148-49. 
 138. Id. at 2155. (“[W]e have never found the Equal Protection Clause implicated in the 
specific circumstance where, as here, government employers are alleged to have made an 
individualized, subjective personnel decision in a seemingly arbitrary or irrational man-
ner.”). 
 139. Id. at 2157. 
 140. Id. at 2161 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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tion141 or fundamental right,142 it might be surprising to learn that a 
whole field of equal protection jurisprudence—the so-called class-of-
one cases—has existed for a long time. Starting with Sioux City 
Bridge Co. v. Dakota County,143 the Supreme Court found a class-of-
one equal protection violation when there was an intentional under-
valuation by state officials of property in the same class as other 
property that was properly valued.144 The Court found that this state 
action contravened the equal protection rights of the company taxed 
on the full value of its property.145
 Some seven decades later, in Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. 
Commission of Webster County,146 the Court considered the class-of-
one theory in a similar scenario involving a taxing scheme. There, 
landowners challenged the valuation placed on their property by the 
county tax assessor.147 The Court held that the County could not as-
sess the plaintiffs’ property “at 50% of what is roughly its current 
value, [when] neighboring comparable property which has not been 
recently sold is assessed at only a minor fraction of that figure.”148
Consequently, the Court held that the taxing scheme of the County 
violated the Equal Protection Clause.149
 In a more recent case involving government regulatory action, the 
Court also applied this class-of-one theory of equal protection. In Vil-
lage of Willowbrook v. Olech,150 the Court recognized a class-of-one 
equal protection claim in a situation in which a property owner sued 
his Village when he was required to have an easement eighteen feet 
longer than was required of other citizens to connect his property to a 
municipal water supply.151 Although Olech, like the other two pre-
vious cases, did not involve a claim of class-based discrimination, the 
Court nevertheless recognized that the Equal Protection Clause also 
                                                                                                                               
 141. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (racial classifica-
tion); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (gender classification); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 
U.S. 634 (1973) (alienage classification). 
 142. See, e.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (right to access justice); Sha-
piro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (right to travel); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 
(1964) (right to vote). 
 143. 260 U.S. 441 (1923). 
 144. Id. at 446-47. As the Court points out in Engquist, this principle derives from 
some of the first cases to be decided under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection 
Clause.  Engquist, 128 S. Ct. at 2153 (quoting  Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 71-72 
(1887)) (“Fourteenth Amendment ‘requires that all persons subjected to . . . legislation 
shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions, both in the privileges con-
ferred and in the liabilities imposed.’ ”).  
 145. Sioux City Bridge, 260 U.S. at 447. 
 146. 488 U.S. 336 (1989). 
 147. Id. at 338. 
 148. Id. at 342. 
 149. Id. at 343. 
 150. 528 U.S. 562 (2000). 
 151. Id. at 563. 
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protects against government action which “irrationally singled out as 
a so-called ‘class of one.’ ”152 In short, the Court in Olech permitted an 
Equal Protection Clause claim where an allegation had been made 
that the government had intentionally treated someone different 
than others and there was no rational basis for the  
disparate treatment.153
 2.   Public Employment and the “Class-of-One” Doctrine 
 In Engquist, the employee had argued that the class-of-one theory 
should also apply to public employment. She argued:  
[1]the Equal Protection Clause protects individuals, not classes; [2] 
that the Clause proscribes “discrimination arising not only from a 
legislative act but also from the conduct of an administrative offi-
cial,”; and [3] that the Constitution applies to the State not only 
when it acts as regulator, but also when it acts as employer.154
Consequently, she argued: “differential treatment of government em-
ployees—even when not based on membership in a class or group—
violates the Equal Protection Clause unless supported by a  
rational basis.”155
 Although Chief Justice Roberts agreed with all three of the em-
ployee’s legal premises, he nevertheless held against her based on his 
views concerning the empirical reality of public workplaces.156 First, 
he sought to distinguish the previous class-of-one equal protection 
claims. Using the phraseology “[w]hat seems to have been significant 
in Olech,” he reasoned that the previous cases were about “the exis-
tence of a clear standard against which departures, even for a single 
plaintiff, could be readily assessed.”157 On the other hand, the gov-
ernment employer was exercising discretionary authority based on 
subjective, individualized determinations.158 Because the other cases 
involved instances of differential treatment which raised concerns of 
arbitrary classification, but the current case did not, those other cas-
es could not be read to require a class-of-one theory in the public em-
ployment context.159 Equal protection in this context is just a “poor 
                                                                                                                               
 152. Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 128 S. Ct. 2146, 2153 (2008) (citing Olech, 528 U.S. 
562). 
 153. Olech, 528 U.S. at 564 (citing Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, 260 U.S. 441 
(1923) and Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Comm’r of Webster County, 488 U.S. 336 (1989)).  
 154. Engquist, 128 S. Ct. at 2150 (citations omitted). 
 155. Id.
 156. Id. at 2151. 
 157. Id. at 2153. 
 158. Id. at 2154-55 (“Unlike the context of arm's-length regulation, such as in Olech,
treating seemingly similarly situated individuals differently in the employment context is 
par for the course.”). 
 159. Id. at 2153-54.  
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fit,”160 at least when the government employer is not making  
class-based distinctions.161
 Chief Justice Roberts next calls upon a line of precedent for sup-
port that government acting as employer has much more latitude to 
act against employees than the government as sovereign when it in-
teracts with citizens.162 Yet, although legally speaking this reading of 
past precedent is accurate,163 the Court had never made the leap to 
previously hold that; therefore, the Equal Protection Clause does not 
apply to individual public employees when government takes arbi-
trary administrative action against them.164
 To make that leap, Chief Justice Roberts relies upon “unique consid-
erations” involving the ability of public employers to run their work-
places as they see fit.165 Calling on similar language from cases involv-
ing public employment and the First Amendment free speech context, 
he argues that courts would be overwhelmed if every government per-
sonnel decision could be challenged under the Equal Protection 
                                                                                                                               
 160. Id. at 2155. 
 161. Id. (citing N.Y. City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 593 (1979) (“[O]ur cas-
es make clear that the Equal Protection Clause is implicated when the government makes 
class-based decisions in the employment context, treating distinct groups of individuals 
categorically differently.”). Public employees might now need to consider alternative due 
process arguments for poor treatment in the workplace now that class-of-one Equal Protec-
tion claims are no longer viable. See Michael L. Wells & Alice E. Snedeker, State-Created 
Property and Due Process of Law: Filling the Void Left by Engquist v. Oregon Department 
of Agriculture, 44 GA. L. REV. 161, 164 (2009).  
 162. Engquist, 128 S. Ct. at 2155. 
 163. Justice Marshall famously stated in Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 
(1968): “[I]t cannot be gainsaid that the State has interests as an employer in regulating 
the speech of its employees that differ significantly from those it possesses in connection 
with regulation of the speech of the citizenry in general.” Id. at 568; see also Waters v. 
Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 671-72 (1994) (plurality opinion) (explaining why government as 
employer has broader powers with regard to its citizen than when acting in its sovereign 
capacity); Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 94 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(“The restrictions that the Constitution places upon the government in its capacity as law-
maker, i.e., as the regulator of private conduct, are not the same as the restrictions it plac-
es upon the government in its capacity as employer.”). 
 164. The Court has, however, made a similar leap of reasoning in the First Amendment 
free speech case of Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006) (holding that public em-
ployee speech made pursuant to their official duties receives no First Amendment protec-
tion). See also Helen Norton, Constraining Public Employee Speech: Government’s Control 
of Its Workers’ Speech to Protect Its Own Expression, 59 DUKE L.J. 1, 4 (2009) (“Courts’ 
unblinking deference to [government speech] assertions . . . frustrates a meaningful com-
mitment to republican government”); Paul M. Secunda, Whither the Pickering Rights of 
Federal Employees?, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 1101, 1106 (2008) (arguing for First Amendment 
Bivens claim for federal employees because “[s]uch protections will not only benefit em-
ployees, but all citizens who depend on public employees to bring a substantial degree of 
transparency and accountability to our representative government”).  
 165. Engquist, 128 S. Ct. at 2151 (“[U]nique considerations applicable when the gov-
ernment acts as employer as opposed to sovereign, lead us to conclude that the class-of-one 
theory of equal protection does not apply in the public employment context.”). 
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Clause.166 He raises the specter of a litigation apocalypse167 without 
pointing to any statistics or other evidence that in fact there has been a 
problem previously with these types of cases flooding the courts.168 In 
the name of managerial prerogative,169 he denies some twenty million 
public employees the protection of rational basis review under the 
Equal Protection Clause.170 This astounding act, supported by five 
other Justices, derives from Chief Justice Roberts’ “ ‘common-sense 
realization that government offices could not function if every em-
ployment decision became a constitutional matter.’ ”171 In other 
words, he takes for granted that such class-of-one claims could not 
factually coexist with an effectively-run, public workplace. 
 Last, Chief Justice Roberts argues for the need to protect public 
at-will employment. This is also a factual error because the vast ma-
jority of public employees are not employed at will. Forty percent of 
them are unionized under a just-cause standard and most of the rest 
are under state or federal civil service protections which also trump 
the common-law standard.172 Nevertheless, Chief Justice Roberts ar-
gues that permitting rational basis review under a class-of-one equal 
protection theory would conflict with this at-will principle.173
                                                                                                                               
 166. See id. (citing Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 150-51 (1983) (“[T]he government 
has a legitimate interest in ‘promot[ing] efficiency and integrity in the discharge of official 
duties, and [in] maintain[ing] proper discipline in the public service.’ ”)). 
 167. See id. (citing Connick, 461 U.S at 143; Waters, 511 U.S. at 674 (plurality opinion)).  
 168. Id. at 2157 (“The practical problem with allowing class-of-one claims to go forward 
in this context is not that it will be too easy for plaintiffs to prevail, but that governments 
will be forced to defend a multitude of such claims in the first place, and courts will be 
obliged to sort through them in a search for the proverbial needle in a haystack.”). As do-
cumented by Andrew Seigel, the Court has a recent propensity to bar the courthouse door 
to civil rights litigants. See Andrew M. Seigel, The Court Against the Courts: Hostility to 
Litigation as an Organizing Theme in the Rehnquist Court's Jurisprudence, 84 TEX. L. 
REV. 1097 (2006); see also Secunda, supra note 164, at 1147 (quoting Wilkie v. Robbins, 127 
S. Ct. 2588, 2615-16 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[T]he 
‘floodgates’ argument . . . has been rehearsed and rejected before.”)). 
 169. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 146 (“When employee expression cannot be fairly consi-
dered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community, gov-
ernment officials should enjoy wide latitude in managing their offices . . . .”); Rosenthal, 
supra note 128.  
 170. See U.S. Census Bureau, Government Employment & Payroll (2008), 
http://www.census.gov/govs/apes/historical_data_2008.html (reporting that federal, state, 
and local government employed over 22 million workers in 2008). 
 171. Engquist, 128 S. Ct. at 2151 (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 143). 
 172. Chief Justice Roberts appears to recognize as much. Engquist, 128 S. Ct. at 2156 
(2008) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(10) (2006)) (“To be sure, Congress and all the States have, 
for the most part, replaced at-will employment with various statutory schemes protecting 
public employees from discharge for impermissible reasons.”). He nevertheless concludes 
that “a government’s decision to limit the ability of public employers to fire at will is an act 
of legislative grace, not constitutional mandate.” Id. And there is “only one Equal Protec-
tion Clause,” Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 211 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring), and that 
clause clearly does not distinguish between government actions taken against individuals 
versus groups. 
 173. Engquist, 128 S. Ct. at 2156 (“[R]ecognition of a class-of-one theory of equal pro-
tection in the public employment context—that is, a claim that the State treated an em-
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 Justice Stevens, writing in dissent for himself and two others, ap-
pears to divine Chief Justice Roberts’ and his cohorts’ motivations. 
Justice Stevens also has a very different view of the empirical reality 
of the public workplace. Seeing the majority decision as being part of 
the same line of reasoning as that found in the Garcetti free speech 
context, he calls out the majority for “carrv[ing out] a novel exception 
out of state employees’ constitutional rights.”174 More specifically, and 
relying on numerous passages from Olech, he observes, “Unless state 
action that intentionally singles out an individual, or a class of indi-
viduals, for adverse treatment is supported by some rational justifi-
cation, it violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s command that no 
State shall ‘deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal pro-
tection of the laws.’ ”175 He therefore takes issue with the majority’s 
idea that public employment decisions are somehow special in being 
inherently discretionary and therefore, a poor fit for class-of-one 
treatment.176 He points out that the zoning decision at issue in Olech 
was similarly discretionary and yet, the Court applied the class-of-
one theory there.177 Stevens also points out that although employ-
ment at will was the wide-spread practice in the 1890s, it has not 
been so at least since the 1960s.178
 Yet, even in the midst of all of these legal arguments, it appears 
that Justice Stevens’ dissenting opinion is really about contesting the 
empirical reality of the majority’s decision. His dissenting opinion 
contends that the subtext of Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion is that 
public agencies will not be able to operate efficiently if they have to 
defend all of these equal protection lawsuits.179 He points out that 
there have been exceedingly few class-of-one equal protection law-
suits hitherto and no evidence exists that any federal, state, or local 
agency, anywhere in the country, has become overrun by such law-
                                                                                                                               
ployee differently from others for a bad reason, or for no reason at all—is simply contrary 
to the concept of at-will employment. The Constitution does not require repudiating that 
familiar doctrine.”).  
 174. Id. at 2157 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006)). 
 175. Id. at 2158 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XIV). 
 176. Accord Robert C. Farrell, The Equal Protection Class of One Claim: Olech, Eng-
quist, and the Supreme Court's Misadventure, 61 S.C. L. REV. 107, 109 (2009) (“By except-
ing all discretionary government action from the class of one claim, Engquist seems to 
eliminate any cause of action for a plaintiff harmed by the vindictive act of a government 
official when that act is part of an exercise of discretion.”). 
 177. Engquist, 128 S. Ct. at 2159. Justice Stevens also points out that there is a “clear 
distinction between an exercise of discretion and an arbitrary decision.” Id.
 178. Id. at 2160 (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 
589, 605-06 (1967)) (“In the 1890’s that doctrine applied broadly to government employ-
ment, but for many years now ‘the theory that public employment which may be denied 
altogether may be subjected to any conditions, regardless of how unreasonable, has been 
uniformly rejected.’ ”). 
 179. Id. (“Presumably the concern that actually motivates today's decision is fear that 
governments will be forced to defend against a multitude of ‘class of one’ claims unless the 
Court wields its meat-axe forthwith.”). 
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suits.180 To the contrary, they remained quite sparse given the large 
number of public employees in the United States.181 Justice Stevens 
therefore concluded that, “[e]ven if some surgery were truly neces-
sary to prevent governments from being forced to defend a multitude 
of equal protection ‘class of one’ claims, the Court should use a scal-
pel rather than a meat-axe.”182
 3.   Engquist Through the Prism of Cultural Cognition Theory 
 Based on the above analysis in Engquist, it would not be surpris-
ing for a reader to take the following lesson from the case: irrespec-
tive of the actual facts of the case, Chief Justice Roberts and his con-
servative allies will rule for employers in most cases and Justice Ste-
vens and his liberal allies will rule similarly for employees.183 Yet, I 
argue that although there might be some truth to these assertions, it 
is more valuable to apply cultural cognition theory to the decision in 
Engquist because this theory helps to explain the mechanism by 
which the majority and dissenting Justices bring their values to bear 
on legally consequential facts in the case.  
 The factual dispute in Engquist, as I have argued above, is over 
the empirical situation that public employers would face as a result 
of recognizing a class-of-one equal protection theory claim. Chief Jus-
tice Roberts maintains that such claims will eventually interfere with 
the ability of government employers to run an efficient workplace.184
Using cultural cognition theory, it is possible to see how Chief Justice 
Roberts’ opinion would appeal to those with cultural beliefs with a 
focus on hierarchical values whose concerns would include whether 
appropriate government authorities would be able to control this type 
of litigation from spinning out of control. Throughout the majority 
opinion, Chief Justice Roberts also mentions the special needs of the 
                                                                                                                               
 180. Id.
 181. Id. at 2160-61 (“Experience demonstrates, however, that these claims are brought 
infrequently, that the vast majority of such claims are asserted in complaints advancing 
other claims as well, and that all but a handful are dismissed well in advance of trial.”). In 
support of this assertion, Justice Stevens states in a footnote: “Prior to the Ninth Circuit's 
decision [sic] this case, ‘class of one’ claims arising in the public-employment context were 
permitted by every court that was presented with one. Yet there have been only approx-
imately 150 cases—both in the district courts and the courts of appeals—addressing such 
claims since Olech [in 2000].” Id. at 2160-61 n.4. 
 182. Id. at 2158. 
 183. This is the simplest form of the argument that judges are motivated by ideology. 
See Kahan, supra note 12. Alternatively, under the more nuanced view of what ideology 
means, Roberts could be viewed as simply resorting to a normative theory to connect the 
abstract concept of equal protection to the particular circumstances present in Engquist.
See id. Either way, the ideological view shrouds in mystery the process by which values 
come to impact judicial decisionmaking.  
 184. See Engquist, 128 S. Ct. at 2154 (“[A]llowing a challenge based on the arbitrary 
singling out of a particular person would undermine the very discretion that such state 
officials are entrusted to exercise.”). 
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government employer to exercise wide latitude in managing the 
workplace but does not explain why this managerial latitude is 
somehow more important in a public workplace than a private one. 
His opinion also discounts risks to republican values if public em-
ployees are squelched because he perceives that these same concerns 
could lead to restrictions on how the employer chooses to run  
its workplace.185
 On the other hand, Justice Stevens’ dissent in Engquist appeals to 
individuals with a cultural commitment to egalitarian values.186 His 
opinion prizes the ability of any individual, whether in government 
employment or not, to call upon the protections of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause if the government acts towards them in an arbitrary and 
irrational manner. To those who agree with Justice Stevens, it would 
appear more important that public employees are treated equally by 
their employers than whether there is some distant potential for fu-
ture litigation that might disrupt the workplace. Justice Stevens also 
appears to try to dispel the fears of the individualists and hierarchs 
by proving that at least the present experience suggests that such 
floods of litigation are unlikely to happen. But notice that it is be-
cause there is necessarily speculation and inconclusive evidence con-
cerning whether such litigation will actually ensue that the cultural 
commitments of the various Justices come to play a more prominent 
role in how they view these legally consequential facts. Even though 
we have some evidence from the lower appellate courts that such 
claims are rather unusual in public employment, the evidence still 
remains inconclusive. As a result, the Justices fall back on their cul-
tural commitments to decide these disputed factual questions. 
 In each opinion in Engquist, then, the cultural worldview indicates 
how Justices will come to evaluate disputed factual claims embedded 
in what they agree is the controlling legal standard. Both sides in each 
of these opinions are sincerely basing their decisions on their views of 
the law, but as Kahan explains, “what they understood the law to re-
quire was nevertheless shaped by their values—operating not as re-
sources for theorizing law, but as subconscious, extralegal influences 
on their perception of legally consequential facts.”187
                                                                                                                               
 185. See also Kahan, supra note 12, at 418 (discussing similar concerns in environmen-
tal law case). 
 186. Interestingly enough, Justice Stevens does not appear to rely on communitarian 
values in the same way that Justice Marshall does in Curtin Matheson. Had he done so, he 
might have pointed out that the loss of this equal protection claim for public employees has 
dire consequences for the community at large. See infra Part V.A. 
 187. Kahan, supra note 12, at 417. 
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IV.   THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CULTURAL COGNITION INSIGHT
 Because of its ability to shed light on the mechanism by which 
values shape judicial opinions, cultural cognition theory is vital to 
future attempts to tamp down cultural judicial biases that invariably 
lead to conflicted legal decisions. As argued above, the recognition of 
cultural cognition as an explanatory device for why judges act the 
way they do in these cases is especially helpful in labor and employ-
ment decisions. This is because many of these judicial decisions ap-
pear to be based on a large amount of speculation and inconclusive 
evidence about: employer and employee motivations (in the labor, 
employment discrimination, and employee benefit contexts); the 
proper measure for efficiency in both the public and private 
workplace; and the proper standard of technical measurements (like 
technological feasibility in the OSHA context).188 In these circums-
tances, this Article maintains that prior cultural commitments of the 
judge do a better job explaining how they will rule in these disputes 
than any other type of ideology-based analyses.189
 Knowing the mechanism by which judicial values foment contro-
versy in labor and employment decisions is important for two related 
reasons. First, if we see judges as acting self-consciously on partisan 
or legal motives to find for the employer versus the employee, the 
whole judicial enterprise is likely to lack legitimacy for a broad seg-
ment of society.190 As Kahan explains, “the cultural cognition thesis, 
if true, [would] spare us from the disappointment associated with be-
lieving that judicial disagreement stems from self-conscious, and self-
consciously concealed, political disregard for law.”191
 When it comes to issues of justice, individuals want to see that 
there are certain minimum conditions of legal process being met.192
One of those essential conditions is an independent, neutral, and un-
biased adjudicator.193 Now, it might be impossible to rid judicial deci-
                                                                                                                               
 188. Id. at 419 (discussing case where cultural cognition provided important insights 
where the factual issues that divided the judges involved considerable uncertainty and 
inconclusive evidence); see also supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
 189. Accord Posner, supra note 7, at 1060 (“At bottom, . . . the sources of ideology are 
both cognitive and psychological, but I think the psychological dominates, because psychol-
ogy exerts such a great influence on our interpretation of our experiences, including the 
weights assigned to the possible consequences of deciding a case one way or the other.”). 
 190. Kahan, supra note 12, at 421. 
 191. Id.
 192. See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990) (maintaining that proce-
dural justice is critical factor in the evaluation of the legitimacy of adjudication); Jenny S. 
Martinez, Process and Substance in the “War on Terror,” 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1013, 1025 
(2008) (“The allure of Legal Process (then and now) is . . . that good process is probably 
more likely to lead to good results.”). But see Martinez, supra (“The danger of Legal Process 
(then and now) is that its seeming neutrality often obscures value judgments about the 
underlying substantive policies.”). 
 193. See Gilles Cuniberti, Beyond Contract—The Case for Default Arbitration in Inter-
national Commercial Disputes, 32 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 417, 449 (2009) (citing Tom R. Tyler, 
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sionmakers of subconscious bias of the cultural variety, but at least 
people should take comfort in knowing that most of the time most 
judges do not make decisions based on partisan or  
normative preferences. 
 This leads to a second, connected point. To the extent that indi-
viduals find legitimacy in judicial systems based on the absence of 
illiberal bias in judges, it is necessary to consider if approaches exist 
to minimize the amount of this type of subconscious bias. Both social 
psychologists and legal scholars suggest that there are.  
V.    METHODS FOR COUNTERACTING JUDICIAL BIAS
 Realizing the importance of identifying the mechanism of disa-
greement as being cultural, the question remains as to what tech-
niques might be helpful in eliminating some of this biased decision-
making from the courts. Two possible approaches include fostering 
humility as a judicial habit of mind and using expressive overdeter-
minism in opinion writing to promote self-affirmation among the  
opinion’s audience.  
A.   Humility as a Judicial Habit of Mind 
 Embracing the concept of judicial humility may minimize cultural 
bias in the judicial decisionmaking process. Initially, the idea derived 
from an article by Cass Sunstein about judges exercising humility in 
decisions which foreseeably cause community outrage.194 Kahan, 
Hoffman, and Braman subsequently adopted the idea as a response 
to the problem of cognitive illiberalism in judges.195
 Sunstein argues that judges, being human, are necessarily prone 
to making mistakes about the law and also about the practical conse-
quences of their decisions.196 One possible solution for this judicial 
predicament is for judges to develop “sensitivity to anticipated com-
munity outrage . . . .”197 In other words, where it is foreseeable that a 
                                                                                                                               
Justice and Power in Civil Dispute Processing, in JUSTICE AND POWER IN SOCIOLEGAL STU-
DIES 309, 330 (Bryant G. Garth and Austin Sarat eds., 1998)) (“[W]hen an unbiased adjudi-
cator who has allowed the parties to present their case fully makes a decision, the parties 
should at least consider that the resolution of their dispute was not illegitimate and thus 
accept the decision.”).  
 194. See Cass R. Sunstein, If People Would Be Outraged by Their Rulings, Should 
Judges Care?, 60 STAN. L. REV. 155 (2007). 
 195. Kahan et al., supra note 1, at 897-98. 
 196. Cf. Sunstein, supra note 194, at 164; accord Rachlinski et al., supra note 77, at 
1221 (“[J]udges, like the rest of us, carry implicit biases.”); Chew & Kelley, supra note 7, at 
1131 (“Increasingly, . . . more legal scholars are acknowledging that judges have human 
inclinations and that judges’ ability to be purely objective about the case may be  
largely theoretical.”). 
 197. Kahan et al., supra note 1, at 897-98 (citing Sunstein, supra note 194, at 164); 
Rachlinski et al., supra note 77, at 1202 (“[P]eople may have the ability to compensate for 
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decision will likely cause outrage among an identifiable subgroup, 
humility “counsels the judge to treat the foreseeability of such out-
rage as a cue that maybe she is in fact wrong . . . .”198
 Referring to appropriate judicial habits of mind in this vein, Ka-
han, Hoffman, and Braman argue that judges should engage in a 
“double mental check,” especially when ruling on a motion or petition 
that would summarily dispose of a case.199 By engaging in this judi-
cial habit of mind, judges would be self-correcting for their inability 
to fully appreciate how their subconscious values operate to shape 
their perceptions of particular facts.200 Rather, when coming to a de-
cision that will likely cause a cultural subcommunity to react with 
outrage, judges should consider whether there “are people who bear 
recognizable identity-defining characteristics—demographic, cultur-
al, political, or otherwise,” and “whether privileging her own view of 
the facts risks conveying a denigrating and exclusionary message to 
members of such subcommunities.”201
 Now, this does not mean that judges should not grant the motion 
or should decide the case in the opposite manner.202 One would cer-
tainly not have expected the Supreme Court to have decided Brown 
v. Board of Education203 differently just because an irate group of 
Southerners preferred that segregation continue in their public 
schools.204 Rather, judges, when possible, might write an opinion in a 
manner that does not unnecessarily alienate a group whose cultural 
identities are in tension with the court’s decision.205
 Consider how judicial humility might have operated in the labor 
and employment law cases examined in this Article. In Curtin Ma-
theson and the dispute over the labor orientation of replacement 
workers, due judicial humility would have counseled that Justice 
                                                                                                                               
the effects of implicit bias . . . .”) (citing Jack Glaser & Eric D. Knowles, Implicit Motivation 
to Control Prejudice, 44 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 164, 164-65, 170-71 (2008)).  
 198. Kahan et al., supra note 1, at 898. 
 199. Id.
 200. Id.
 201. Id. at 898-99. 
 202. Id. at 901 (“[A]ppropriate humility does not forbid judges to select an outcome that 
is likely to be more congenial to one cultural style or another, but only to justify that out-
come in terms that avoid cultural partisanship.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 203. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 204. See Cass R. Sunstein, Trimming, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1049, 1070 (2009) (“Of course 
judicial rulings on some issues will inevitably offend some people, and judges should not 
trim simply to avoid offense. In striking down school segregation, the Supreme Court did 
not trim.”). “Trimming,” as Sunstein uses the word, refers to an interpretative strategy 
whereby judges attempt to “steer between the poles.” Id. at 1051. 
 205. Kahan et al., supra note 1, at 901 (“Alternatively, the court can decide the case 
summarily on some announced basis that doesn't stigmatize the potentially aggrieved sub-
community's view of reality as flawed.” (emphasis omitted)); Sunstein, supra note 204, at 
1053 (describing judicial trimming as involving “borrow[ing] ideas from both sides in in-
tense social controversies” and as seeking to “preserve what is deepest and most sensible in 
competing positions”). 
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Scalia consider that individuals come with different circumstances to 
a picket line. At the very least, this approach might have helped him 
to tone down his rhetoric and write his opinion in a manner that 
would appeal in different ways to both management and union-types. 
So, rather than focusing on the inevitable antagonism between re-
placement workers and strikers, Justices Scalia might have agreed 
on emphasizing the need for a consistent standard that takes into 
account the different reasons why workers cross picket lines, empha-
sizing the need for uniformity in this area of the law, or focused on 
the advantages of a political rather than judicial regulation of these 
strikebreaking regulations. In any event, Justice Scalia’s highly 
charged language about the relationship between strikers and re-
placement workers needlessly burdens the law with cultural parti-
sanship, detracting from its legitimacy.206
 Justice Marshall could also have chosen a different route in argu-
mentation in support of the no presumption rule in Curtin Matheson.
Rather than focusing on what the motivations of replacement work-
ers might have been, he could have just embraced an approach that 
focused on the policy decision of the NLRB, which already contained 
indicia of appropriate judicial habits of mind. Indeed, he spends a 
significant amount of time pointing out that the Court normally de-
fers to interpretations of the Board that are rational and consistent 
with the NLRA.207 Perhaps, rather than focusing on the subjective 
sentiments of replacement workers, the Court could have just “em-
phasized . . . that the NLRB has the primary responsibility for devel-
oping and applying national labor policy,”208 that “a Board rule is en-
titled to deference even if it represents a departure from the Board's 
prior policy,”209 and concluded that because no one knows with cer-
tainty whether individual replacement workers support or do not 
support a union, the Board’s approach was one of a number of rea-
sonable ones.210 This judicial approach would offer the advantage of 
not having the Justices engage in a cultural debate over the relevant 
empirical facts about striker replacement workers’ motivations. In a 
word, it would have been a decision full of judicial humility. 
                                                                                                                               
 206. See Kahan et al., supra note 1, at 903 (discussing similar “take no prisoners” ap-
proach by Justice Scalia in Scott v. Harris).  
 207. NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 494 U.S. 775, 786 (1990) (“This 
Court . . . has accorded Board rules considerable deference.”). 
 208. Id.
 209. Id. at 787. 
 210. Indeed, Justice Marshall already wrote something similar in his opinion: “Al-
though replacements often may not favor the incumbent union, the Board reasonably con-
cluded, in light of its long experience in addressing these issues, that replacements may in 
some circumstances desire union representation despite their willingness to cross the pick-
et line.” Id. at 789. 
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 In the Engquist decision, Chief Justice Roberts could have exer-
cised more humility by not just considering the desires of public em-
ployers to have wide latitude to run their workplaces, but also the 
concerns of a discernible group of public employees and the citizenry 
at large who depend on these workers to keep government transpa-
rent and accountable. Especially in a case like Engquist where the 
jury already rendered a verdict for the plaintiff based on equal pro-
tection concerns,211 Roberts should have thought about what message 
his decision sent to the various cultural subgroups. Roberts would 
not have had to change how he ruled but rather could have changed 
how he talked about the facts in the way that he did rule. Exercising 
judicial humility in this way, Chief Justice Roberts could have 
avoided offending millions of public employees by saying, in effect, 
that they do not have the same equal protection rights as others who 
come under this foundational provision of the federal Constitution. 
 All this may feel and sound a little too wishy-washy for some, and 
one is certainly right to wonder whether this type of debiasing strat-
egy will actually do much good in helping judges overcome their nat-
ural cultural biases.212 As Kahan, Hoffman, and Braman point out in 
their discussion of the Scott v. Harris case, however, this exercise in 
judicial humility is helpful if for no other reason than it helps to 
guide courts away from unnecessary decisions that appear to em-
brace partisanship and delegitimize the concerns of a group of citi-
zens who come out on the losing end in such cases.213
 Moreover, recent research on educating judges about their own 
biases has shown that “more precise techniques in encouraging self-
analysis” may be more successful than past debiasing strategies.214
For instance, one such strategy that would require judges “to consid-
er the opposite” might help them to overcome entrenched thinking 
that leads to culturally biased errors.215 In other contexts, this strate-
gy has proven effective,216 and there is every reason to believe that 
                                                                                                                               
 211. See Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 128 S. Ct. 2146, 2159 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing) (“The jury’s verdict . . . established that there was no rational basis for either treating 
Engquist differently from other employees or for the termination of her employment.”).  
 212. See Levit, supra note 19, at 437 (“One concern about debiasing in the realm of 
legal decisionmaking is that judges might come to have excessive confidence in their own 
decisional abilities and be resistant to impartiality training.”). 
 213. Kahan et al., supra note 1, at 899. 
 214. See Levit, supra note 19, at 436 (“More recent research in debiasing training de-
monstrates that more precise techniques in encouraging self-analysis of specific cognitive 
biases have better prospects of success.”). 
 215. Id. at 436-37 (“This [debiasing] strategy—sometimes referred to in shorthand as 
‘consider the opposite’—is based on the idea that a number of cognitive biases are caused 
by ‘the tendency to neglect contradicting evidence’ [and] that specific instruction in consi-
dering alternative beliefs or positions will minimize the entrenched thinking that leads to 
both probability and self-serving or motivational errors.” (citations omitted)).  
 216. See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L.
REV. 2463, 2523-24 (2004) (“Psychologists have repeatedly found that considering the op-
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judges, most being conscientious seekers of justice, may be receptive 
to taking seriously social science research which highlights frailties 
in their own judging behaviors.217
 Yet no matter how dedicated judges are to this debiasing enter-
prise, it is beyond cavil, and even beyond what the most idealistic of 
commentators could contemplate, that unions and management, em-
ployers and employees, will continue to be at loggerheads over what 
arrangements provide the greatest amount of material well-being for 
society. This persistent state of affairs only means that judges will 
have to work harder to craft their decisions with appropriate humili-
ty and self-awareness. It might be difficult to measure any meaning-
ful progress in judges’ decisions in this regard empirically,218 but if 
judges would take the time to contemplate that “what strikes them 
as an ‘obvious’ matter of fact might in fact be viewed otherwise by a 
discrete and identifiable subcommunity,”219 such a judicial approach 
could function as a means to take out the more troubling cultural 
cognition that appears to be at play in many cases across different 
areas of the law. In the end, by having judges consider the mechan-
ism by which they bring values to bear on legally-consequential facts, 
they can begin the work of counteracting the message of exclusion 
associated presently with too many contested legal decisions. 
B.   Expressive Overdetermination and Self-Affirmation 
 Another plausible way to overcome biased decisionmaking would 
be to embrace the theory of expressive overdetermination. Under this 
theory, laws would be interpreted by judges to forge a pluralistic ac-
commodation of competing worldviews. In this manner, judicial deci-
                                                                                                                               
posite reduces overconfidence, biased information assimilation, biased hypothesis testing, 
and excessive perseverance of beliefs. This technique is effective because it tears people 
away from anchors favorable to their own positions and makes contrary anchors more ac-
cessible and salient.”). See also Gregory Mitchell, Libertarian Paternalism Is an Oxymoron,
99 NW. U. L. REV. 1245, 1256 n.40 (2005) (“Asking . . . [people] to consider alternative or 
opposing arguments ameliorate[s] the adverse effects of several biases, including the pri-
macy or anchoring effect, biased assimilation of new evidence, biased hypothesis testing, 
the overconfidence phenomenon, the explanation bias, the self-serving bias, and the  
hindsight bias.”). 
 217. See Gregory C. Sisk & Michael Heise, Judges and Ideology: Public and Academic 
Debates About Statistical Measures, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 743, 776 n.197, 777 (2005). 
 218. See Harry T. Edwards & Michael A. Livermore, Pitfalls of Empirical Studies That 
Attempt to Understand the Factors Affecting Appellate Decisionmaking, 58 DUKE L.J. 1895, 
1963 (2009) (“It is far from clear . . . that empirical scholars will ever be able to meaningful-
ly measure the effects of cultural cognition on appellate decisionmaking.”). Yet, these same 
authors appear to concede that cultural biases can be reduced through appellate judges’ 
deliberations. Id. (“[T]he process of deliberation in a collegial environment can reduce the 
impact of any individual judge's cultural cognition.”). I would add that although I agree 
that deliberations must affect appellate decisionmaking, I also cannot measure those ef-
fects, and do not try to, in this paper.  
 219. Kahan et al., supra note 1, at 899. 
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sions would be fashioned with meanings that are satisfactory simul-
taneously to hierarchs and egalitarians, individualists and communi-
tarians.220 Decisions would not lose partisan social meaning, but 
would be infused “with so many that every cultural group can find 
affirmation of its worldviews within it.”221 The reason why this theory 
works, according to psychological theory, is because it allows individ-
uals to affirm their identity in some aspect of the law.222
 Let’s consider how this approach would play out with the cases 
studied in this Article. In Curtin Matheson, Justices Marshall and 
Scalia differed on the meaning of legally consequential facts about 
why permanent replacement workers cross the picket line. Justice 
Marshall focused on a myriad of possible reasons and decided that a 
no-presumption rule concerning whether these workers were prou-
nion or antiunion made the most sense. Justice Scalia, for his part, 
focused on the antagonism between replacement workers and unions 
as a result of the many ways in which unions work for the advance-
ment of strikers over replacement workers.  
 Drafting a legal opinion which affirmed the values of the dissent-
ing Justices might have made the disagreement in Curtin Matheson 
less dramatic. By utilizing expressive overdetermination, Justice 
Marshall could have continued to discuss the many reasons why 
workers might choose to cross the picket line, while equally giving 
credence to the antagonism theory advanced by Justice Scalia. Be-
cause the standard of whether to follow the NLRB in such cases is 
whether the agency interpretation is consistent with the Act, perhaps 
Justice Marshall could have emphasized more of the posture in which 
the Court reviews such cases.223 He could have even said that he 
might well agree with Justice Scalia in some instances about the end-
less antagonism between the union and replacement workers, but 
                                                                                                                               
 220. Kahan, supra note 17, at 146. 
 221. Id. at 145. The concept of expressive overdeterminism finds resonance with Suns-
tein’s idea of “trimming.” See also Sunstein, supra note 204, at 1053. 
 222. Sunstein, supra note 204, at 1070 (“Trimmers try to reach results that can be 
accepted or at least not rejected by people with disparate self-understandings and different 
foundational commitments. The hope is that trimming can obtain support for people from 
different ‘cultures.’ ”). See also Kahan, supra note 17, at 149 (“[S]o long as [individuals] can 
see evidence that the law in fact affirms their outlooks, they do not demand that the law be 
framed in a way that denies persons of an opposing cultural persuasion the opportunity to 
experience the same sense of affirmation.”). In this regard, social psychologist Geoffrey 
Cohen and his cohorts have demonstrated that providing information to people that raises 
their self-esteem allows them to take a position on an issue that is at odds with their nor-
mal cultural group. See Geoffrey L. Cohen et al., When Beliefs Yield to Evidence: Reducing 
Biased Evaluation by Affirming the Self, 26 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1151 
(2000). See also generally David K. Sherman & Geoffrey L. Cohen, Accepting Threatening 
Information: Self-Affirmation and the Reduction of Defensive Biases, 11 CURRENT DIREC-
TIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI. 119 (2002). 
 223. See supra notes 207-210 and accompanying text.  
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there is enough evidence to support the Board’s no-presumption, poli-
cy-based rule in this case.  
 To be clear, I will be the first to admit that such an expressive 
overdetermination approach might not work well with judges who 
are ideologically committed to their way of looking at the world.224
But perhaps through this technique, other judges in an appellate set-
ting might be moved and provide more consensus for the majority 
opinion or be more successful in counseling moderation to their col-
leagues.225 Of course, this is all sheer speculation, but there would not 
appear to be any harm in attempting to draft the opinion in a way 
that allows deliberating judges to come to greater agreement.  
 As far as Engquist, an expressively overdetermined decision would 
attempt to not only address the disparate concerns of Chief Justice 
Roberts and Justice Stevens, but might conclude the opinion by fo-
cusing on an overarching principle to which both sides would seem 
likely to agree. One of the parts missing from Justice Stevens’ dis-
sent, in my opinion, was some acknowledgment of the role that public 
employees play in keeping the government honest.226 The mantra 
“government of the people, by the people, for the people,”227 means 
that public employees are the vanguard of the citizenry;228 they alert 
other citizens to issues of fraud, waste, and abuse in government. 
Clearly, if such employees do not have meaningful legal redress be-
cause their equal protection rights have been drastically reduced, not 
just the public employees suffer, but all Americans.229
                                                                                                                               
 224. See Edwards & Livermore, supra note 218, at 1964 (“There may be some judges 
who care little about their colleagues' views and who are determined not to engage in col-
legial interactions. However, they are not in the majority.”). 
 225. See id. (“During the course of judicial deliberations, judges more often than not 
persuade one another until a consensus is reached.”). 
 226. See Norton, supra note 164, at 4 (“Courts’ unblinking deference to [government 
employer] assertions . . . frustrates a meaningful commitment to republican government 
because it allows government officials to punish, and thus deter, whistleblowing and other 
on-the-job speech that would otherwise inform voters’ views and facilitate their ability to 
hold the government politically accountable for its choices.”). 
 227. The phrase, oft-repeated, comes from President Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address. 
Abraham Lincoln, Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863), available at
http://showcase.netins.net/web/creative/lincoln/speeches/gettysburg.htm (“[T]hat we here 
highly resolve that these dead shall not have died in vain—that this nation, under God, 
shall have a new birth of freedom—and that government of the people, by the people, for 
the people, shall not perish from the earth.”).  
 228. See Paul M. Secunda, Garcetti’s Impact on the First Amendment Speech Rights of 
Federal Employees, 7 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 117, 144 (2008) (contending that current state 
of federal employee free speech rights has taken away from the three million federal em-
ployees of the United States the ability to be the vanguard of the citizenry).  
 229. Norton, supra note 164, at 7 (“[G]overnment’s expansive claims to control public 
employees’ expression mark a disturbing trend that imperils not only free speech rights of 
more than twenty million government workers, but also the public’s interest in  
transparent government.”). 
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 So, Chief Justice Roberts could have written an expressively over-
determined opinion while keeping his current legal arguments about 
past case precedent, the nature of government employment, and the 
importance of public employment at will. But expressive overdeter-
minism would have then counseled Roberts to concede some validity 
to Justice Stevens’ evidence about the current lack of class-of-one 
claims. Roberts might have highlighted the importance in a republi-
can form of government of ensuring that those who work for the gov-
ernment can report to fellow citizens without fear of retribution. 
With that principle as the backdrop, he might have continued that it 
was still appropriate to eliminate rational basis equal protection re-
view from public employees for claims of irrational government beha-
vior because such a principle would not, in fact, substantially under-
mine this important principle of republican government. By taking 
this tact, at least, he would have permitted Justice Stevens, and 
those who agree with him, to affirm their communitarian values by 
discussing the needs of a vigilant public workforce to maintain trans-
parent and accountable governments. An expressively overdeter-
mined opinion would not only define those realities of the workplace 
in the terms of the employees needs, but also in terms of the needs of 
public employees and the larger citizenry to allow those who cherish 
communitarian values to find affirmance of their values in his opi-
nion.230 This balancing approach to these issues would have also been 
consistent with what Chief Justice Roberts himself suggests is re-
quired in these types of cases.231
 Now, this is not to say that expressive overdeterminism always 
supports an ad hoc test as in Curtin Matheson or a balancing test as I 
propose in Engquist. Even in a bright-line rule case, a court could 
fashion an analysis which seeks to illuminate how different types of 
values are embraced by the legal rule. Moreover, I do not mean to 
suggest that the more progressive or liberal judicial views will be 
necessarily advanced by this theory. Instead, the hope is whether a 
conservative or liberal judge, or a mixed panel of appellate judges, is 
writing the majority opinion, the decision can be written in a way 
that bears “a plurality of meanings,” so that it “relieve[s] both sides 
                                                                                                                               
 230. See id. at 14. Accord William D. Araiza, Constitutional Rules and Institutional 
Roles: The Fate of the Equal Protection Class of One and What It Means For Congressional 
Power to Enforce Constitutional Rights, 62 SMU L. REV. 27, 69-70 (2009) (“Engquist . . . 
pretermits any such case-by-case balancing by concluding that equal protection class-of-one 
rights simply do not apply in the workplace context . . . . The result reflects yet another 
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includes constitutional interests on both sides.”). 
 231. Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 128 S. Ct. 2146, 2152 (2008) (“[A]lthough govern-
ment employees do not lose their constitutional rights when they accept their positions, 
those rights must be balanced against the realities of the employment context.”).   
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[of the dispute] of the anxiety that the state was taking sides in a  
cultural dispute.”232
 One additional point: expressive overdeterminism might make 
disingenuous, outcome-determinative reasoning in judicial opinions 
happen less often. By showing how a legal interpretation considers 
the concerns of various cultural viewpoints, it would permit judicial 
decisionmakers to write forthrightly about how a legal interpretation 
expresses meanings distinctive of their own values.233 Simultaneous-
ly, this approach would keep the decisionmaker from “insist[ing] that 
the promotion of secular aims—such as avoidance of harm or the 
production of societal wealth—motivates their advocacy independent-
ly of any understanding of how a law or policy coheres with their vi-
sions of an ideal society.”234 In this manner, expressive overdetermi-
nation, which capitalizes on ideas of individual self-affirmation, could 
provide a powerful tool in toning down the rhetoric and the over-
heated disagreements, which are all-too-frequent in not only labor 
and employment law cases, but also in many other types of cases. 
VI.   CONCLUSION
The theory of cultural cognition provides a more satisfying expla-
nation than ideologically driven theories about how hotly contested 
cases are decided by judges with different cultural worldviews be-
cause it focuses on the mechanism by which values impact judicial 
decisionmaking. Believing that cultural cognition theory provides the 
best explanation, this Article suggests some strategies for ridding 
judicial opinions of cognitive illiberalism, especially in the area of la-
bor and employment law.  
 In so doing, I hope that cultural cognition theory will help reclaim 
legitimacy for the judicial function, while simultaneously focusing 
future scholarly energies on how to counteract biased decisionmaking 
at its root causes. Indeed, the very act of having judges work in good 
faith to counteract messages of exclusion associated presently with 
many labor and employment law decisions would be a major step to-
ward diminishing cognitive illiberalism in these types of cases.  
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 234. Id. To be clear, “expressive overdetermination can't ‘debias’ [individuals], at least 
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